Pakistan’s crisis A Country In A Constitutional Limbo

Salman Haidar
The Statesman, 29 November

Cascading events in Pakistan since President Musharraf declared emergency on 3 November have added up to a sense of uncertainty about what could happen next. The initial threat to challenge the President’s authority on the streets fizzled out, after being suppressed by harsh police action and the blanking out of the media. Major political leaders were confined, released, detained again, in a cat-and-mouse game that left everyone guessing.

There was a considerable international hue and cry, but President Musharraf did not relent, moving instead to build further on the power he had assumed through the declaration of emergency, and to try to give it some semblance of legitimacy. The reconstituted Supreme Court, which is now packed with handpicked judges, has been moved to endorse his actions since November 3 and legitimise the presidential orders that tamper with the constitution.

Through these means, it would seem that the President has taken to himself the authority he needs to resume the transition to civilian rule and elections that he claimed was his goal, with himself at the centre of it, and to thwart the disruption threatened by violent insurgent groups, a reckless opposition and an irresponsible media.

More problems

But though on the surface there may be a semblance of control, many problems are bubbling up. The shock effect of the emergency has not prevented the political parties and other activist groups from raising a challenge to the President. His formal authority may have been buttressed through the Supreme Court but that has not enhanced his domestic power in some key matters. Insurgent groups in the frontier region are undaunted, witness the continued armed resistance in Swat and elsewhere in the North West Frontier Province. Urban terrorism also shows no abatement, several incidents having occurred, including suicide attacks, and there is no sign that emergency rule will help bring matters under control.

Internationally, the emergency has lost the President support and backing. That was slipping as it was, and the ambiguities of his dealings with the Taliban and Al Qaida were catching up with him. Even earlier, when there were signs that the President was contemplating the declaration of emergency as a way of dealing with his mounting problems, there was an immediate response and much pressure from the USA to head it off. Thus when he finally went ahead with it, he could have been under no illusions about how it would be received. Yet he felt it necessary to proceed as he did, no doubt because an adverse judgment from the court was feared that would have unraveled the presidency.

There has been a great deal of pressure from abroad to compel a change of course by President Musharraf. A spate of statements has come from Washington and other Western capitals bemoaning what has happened. Under pressure, the President has promised to shed his uniform and function as a civilian leader, and he may feel compelled to go through with it very soon. Though overall support for him has been reiterated, US actions do not suggest that he is any longer viewed as the indispensable leader of his country. A few days ago Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte was in Pakistan on a mission of persuasion. Pakistani observers did not fail to notice that Mr Negroponte spent more time with the Vice-Chief, General Kiyani, than he did with President Musharraf. One need not read too much into it but these meetings have been interpreted in some quarters as indicating that he was hedging his bets. And once any notion of finding alternatives to the present regime appears, there is no knowing where it can lead.

Currently, Pakistan is in a constitutional limbo and more than one way of resolving the present situation can be envisaged. For instance, in the fertile political imaginings of local observers, the caretaker Prime Minister Mr Somroo, widely known and well respected, under appropriate conditions could be a credible presidential candidate; and there could be others, depending on how the elections go and on how relations between the major political parties develop. This is not to suggest that anything along these lines is in the works, only to point to the inherent uncertainties in Pakistan’s current situation. The pre-emergency idea of a smooth transition that would retain Mr Musharraf in the presidency, without his uniform, sharing power with the PPP chief Ms Bhutto, appears increasingly remote.

The demand for free and fair elections is being raised from all sides. This is not as straightforward as it might seem, for the fear has been expressed that fair elections will not be possible while the Provisional Constitutional Order is in force, as it gives untrammelled authority to the government. So lifting the PCO is demanded as a necessary condition for the polls. But where would that leave Mr Musharraf? Would his position be affected? There can be a difference of view on this point. Indeed, there is plenty in the constitutional niceties to keep many lawyers engaged and to add to the directions in which the crisis could evolve.

There is also the fast changing political setting. Ms Bhutto is already back home, her power-sharing deal with Musharraf seemingly in tatters. Nawaz Sharif has also returned in time to make a bid for success through the elections. These former Prime Ministers, each heading a strong political party, will surely have a say in the future turn of events.

Political formations

There are other political formations, too, that will have to be taken into account. Beyond that, there is the role of the army. Gen. Kiyani, who is expected to move up to the top when President Musharraf sheds his uniform, is described as a thoroughgoing professional who would like to see the army keep away from politics. But does this mean that the army under him, or under anyone else, will be prepared to shed the part it has played for so many decades in national security affairs? These and other similar questions are reminders of the looming ambiguities about the future.

It is noteworthy that Pakistan’s discomfiture has not stirred India to any attempt to take propaganda advantage of it. Official statements in New Delhi have been restrained, and the media reaction sober. Even the suspension of Pakistan’s membership of the Commonwealth has not had much significance attached to it. It could be that the opening up of contact over the last few years, however limited in scope, has served to blunt the fine edge of animosity between the two countries.
Nobody in India finds it untoward that the Pakistan cricket team is touring the country at a time when civil liberties and the rule of law have been abruptly curtailed in Pakistan. Perhaps there is an underlying realisation that trouble in Pakistan does not necessarily bode any good for India. Rather, what is desired is an early internal settlement and an end to the current uncertainty.

The author is India’s former Foreign Secretary