Non-Proliferation - Missiles The New Currency Of Power

Gurmeet Kanwal
The Statesman, 13/14 December

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the most important building block of the international non-proliferation regime, has 190 members and only three India, Israel and Pakistan have opted to stay out. The three pillars of the NPT are non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and enabling technologies by any of the signatories to the treaty; the right to peaceful energy and technology for all and nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapons states. Of these, disarmament has always been the most neglected.

Contrary to expectations that the NPT would provide a “universal standard of non-proliferation”, it has only been partially successful. Since the NPT closed the gates in 1970, several states have crossed the nuclear threshold. While India and Pakistan openly announced themselves to be states with nuclear weapons in May 1998, Israel is widely suspected to be a closet nuclear power. Since 1991, several “wannabe” SNW have come tumbling out: Iraq in 1991, North Korea in 1992, Libya in 2003 and Iran in 2003. The revelations in 2003 of the proliferation Wal-Mart run by the AQ Khan network from Pakistan were the last straw that virtually broke the back of the international non-proliferation regime.

Little concern

During the 1970s and the 1980s, emphasis in nuclear non-proliferation was normally laid on arresting horizontal proliferation by denying technology to countries outside the “London Club”. There was little concern about vertical proliferation within the five recognised Nuclear Weapons States. Serious thought was never given to Article VI of the NPT by the NWS and the world failed to move towards eventual nuclear disarmament. After the end of the Cold War, the focus shifted to protecting the fissile material stockpile of the former Soviet states from falling into the wrong hands and also on containing possible leakage of nuclear weapons technology.

Around this time, the three major non-signatories of the NPT acquired nuclear weapons. Israel did so through the acquiescence of the Western world, India by converting its indigenous civilian programme to weapons capability and Pakistan through clandestine arrangements with other countries that shared common interests.

Today, there are nine nuclear powers in the world, including North Korea. Iran, also an original signatory of the NPT, is a cusp state that may threaten to go nuclear and even withdraw from the NPT because of the continued perception of the extraordinary deterrence value of nuclear weapons. There has been renewed emphasis on preventing proliferation of WMDs since September 11, 2001.

In recent years, unsettling trends have been gaining momentum in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. North Korea’s withdrawal from NPT and its subsequent nuclear test without serious consequences is likely to encourage other states to also take the plunge ~ or threaten to do so. Iran’s violation of IAEA safeguards has led to further tensions in the West Asian region that is already plagued by a war in Iraq and low intensity conflict in Palestine and Lebanon. The flourishing international black market in nuclear and missile items from Russia and other post-Soviet states might put nuclear weapons-grade material and even nuclear weapons up for sale. The spread of biological and chemical weapons has increased the chances of WMD terrorism and the danger that it will inflict deep wounds on democratic societies. Despite grand policy pronouncements, China is yet to become a consistently reliable partner in the global battle against proliferation.

The West is widely blamed for its “double-standard” approach to non-proliferation that exempts pro-Western regimes and states from criticism for their nuclear programmes and concentrates exclusively on those Third World regimes that oppose the West ideologically, politically and/or militarily. Many Western moves, such as unilateral sanctions against alleged proliferators, are seen as being intended to eliminate competition in profitable areas of international trade, e.g. nuclear energy production, rather than as steps to fight proliferation. France, UK and the US have declared their intention to use nuclear weapons against “rogue states” even if the attack is non-nuclear. Such perceptions result in widespread doubts about the desirability of following the non-proliferation policies and initiatives promoted by the West.

The international community has other serious concerns as well. The missile development programmes of Iran, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan pose major challenges as missiles are the new currency of power. The US is continuing to design new nuclear warheads as part of its Reliable Replacement Warhead programme. It is a hybrid design that is based on well-tested elements of older designs combined with new safety and security measures. However, computer simulation may not be adequate and actual testing may be needed to prove the efficacy of the new warhead. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty by the US is seen as a new obstacle for non-proliferation efforts.

The deployment of a national missile defence system by the US is likely to lead to the modernisation of nuclear forces by China. China is likely to build over 100 new mobile ICBMs with MIRV-ed warheads. These will threaten not only the USA, but also Russia, India, and Japan. Consequent to this development, Japan and Taiwan may choose to exercise their nuclear option. However, it must be noted that there have been some positive developments and success stories as well. Iraq destroyed its nuclear weapons infrastructure post-1991 Gulf War. NPT extension and CTBT signature in 1995-96 reinforced non-proliferation norms. Russia has accepted the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement export controls. China has finally embraced nuclear export control laws and policies consistent with the NPT and will hopefully implement them diligently. The Pakistan Army-A Q Khan nuclear Wal-Mart has been exposed though other rogue scientists in Pakistan are still to be exposed and booked. The post-test nuclear programme freeze in North Korea is a positive sign. Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Libya, Romania, and South Africa have renounced nuclear arms and accepted strict international controls. Post-Soviet Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were denuclearised in 1996 and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.
Notable case

The most notable case is that of Libya. The international community, led by the US, made Libyan efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability difficult and frustrating. Increasingly painful costs were imposed on Libya for its covert nuclear weapons ambitions. Credible prospects of tangible and meaningful benefits were held out if Gaddafi turned away from pursuing his goal to acquire nuclear weapons. Threats of dire retribution were also held out. Gaddafi was eventually persuaded of the ultimate futility of acquiring nuclear weapons. The lesson that clearly emerged was that even nuclear weapon “wannabes” can be persuaded to reverse course and abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions.

In stark contrast with Iran and North Korea, India has agreed to take steps that will bring it into the non-proliferation mainstream, including: placing its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and monitoring; signing and implementing an Additional Protocol, which allows more extensive inspections by the IAEA; ensuring that its nuclear materials and technologies are secured and prevented from diversion, including its recent passage of a law to create a robust national export control system; refraining from transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already possess them and supporting efforts to limit their spread; working to conclude a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing; and, adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.

Even though India opted to stay out of the NPT, its policies have been consistent with the key provisions of the treaty contained in Articles I, II and VI that apply to the Nuclear Weapon State. It is now well recognised that India has neither transferred nuclear weapons to any other state nor assisted any to acquire these. India’s exports of nuclear materials have always been under safeguards and India has been a leader in urging the NWS to pursue negotiations to achieve the goal of total nuclear disarmament.

Compared with this impeccable track record, some of them have been active collaborators in or silent spectators to continuing clandestine and illegal proliferation, including export of nuclear weapon components and technologies. The NWS have followed a discriminatory and inconsistent approach to enforcing the treaty, with selective focus on the recipients of clandestine proliferation but not enough attention on the sources of supply. The USA and Russia have consistently refused to cut their nuclear stockpiles substantively even after the end of the Cold War. Such an attitude feeds and strengthens the belief that nuclear weapons are a currency of power.

Revived interest

There is a revival of interest in nuclear energy, not just due to rising oil prices but also due to serious environmental concerns leading to rising demand for clean energy and also due to the inevitability of the shrinking fossil fuel resources. Today’s challenge is to simultaneously ensure that while horizontal as well as vertical proliferation of nuclear warhead technology is prevented, trade and commerce in nuclear technology are allowed to flourish unhindered.

Understandably, the non-proliferation ayatollahs the world over have been up in arms against the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement. Policy and opinion-makers in India readily accept that the Indo-US nuclear deal represents a major concession that has been made by the US and fully understand that it is an issue of concern for the international non-proliferation community. However, they like to emphasise that this privilege has been accorded in recognition of India’s responsible and unblemished conduct in limiting horizontal proliferation and that sufficient safeguards have been built in to take care of the non-proliferation concerns that might arise as fallout of the deal.

In this era of strategic uncertainty, it is important to see the Indo-US nuclear deal in the larger geo-strategic framework and US policy and opinion makers are clearly taking their bearings from the emerging world order. Analysts in the US are divided in their perceptions of the deal. Dr Stephen Cohen is of the view that the agreement enhances American strategic interests, and “if properly implemented, it will advance, not retard, American non-proliferation objectives.” The initiative will help India move to an energy strategy that makes it less dependent on imported oil and that will positively address American global environmental concerns. Former Defence Secretary William Perry and a former top Pentagon aide, Ashton Carter, back the agreement. However, Robert Gallucci, a former top non-proliferation official at the State Department who negotiated a 1994 nuclear agreement with North Korea, urged the US Congress to reject the deal because it “trashes” the non-proliferation regime.

There are other detractors of this deal as well. Noam Chomsky believes that “the agreement, if implemented, will be a serious blow to the NPT, and the network of treaties and international regimes in which it is embedded, some of which have already been dismantled by the Bush administration.”

The fact that India has agreed to place two-thirds of its nuclear reactors under international safeguards has gone down well with most US lawmakers. Congressman Jim Kolbe said in his testimony to the House International Relations Committee: “If Congress enacts this legislation, India will have tougher nuclear scrutiny than is given to China, Russia and the major nuclear powers. None of these countries’ reactors are under any inspection regime. India would place at least two-thirds of its programme under the direct eye of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” It is this fact that finally convinced many initially skeptical Senators and Congressmen that the deal would have positive non-proliferation fallout and they supported it whole heartedly.

Dr Ashley Tellis has gone one step further: “Bringing India into the global non-proliferation regime through a lasting international agreement that defines clearly enforceable benefits and obligations not only strengthens American efforts to stem proliferation but also enhances US national security… It recognises that it is unreasonable to ask India to continue to bear the burdens of contributing to ensuring the viability of the global non-proliferation regime in perpetuity, while it suffers stiff and encompassing sanctions from that same regime.” Michael A Levi and Charles D Ferguson recommend that the US should focus on the right objectives: “Finding a workable path forward requires that Congress reserve the bulk of its political capital for a handful of top-tier objectives. It should focus on preventing Indian nuclear testing and fundamental changes in Indian nuclear strategy, rather than on blocking growth in the number of Indian nuclear weapons...”

These experts are also of the view that the Indo-US nuclear deal had no significant impact on the decisions of Iran and North Korea. In any case, the latter has now agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in return for energy and other aid. Iran continues to blow hot and cold but also appears to be gradually veering around to becoming more accommodating. While it will definitely react violently to a military attack on its enrichment facilities, needs.

Hence, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Indo-US nuclear deal does not in any noteworthy manner undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime even as it makes a positive contribution to it by bringing the bulk of India’s civilian nuclear power reactors under the ambit of IAEA safeguards and inspections.

International non-proliferation efforts would be considerably strengthened if all nuclear weapon states were to cut their arsenals, lower the alert status of their strategic weapons and boost cooperation in nuclear technologies for economic development, especially in the energy sector. Cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the NWS would be meaningful only if these were irreversible and verifiable. The strategies that must be followed to further international non-proliferation efforts should frustrate emerging nuclear weapons wannabes, contain “loose nukes” and build walls between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The “closed fuel cycle” gives errant countries an inherent capacity to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Early consensus

The P-5 should build an international regime alongside the NPT to promote civilian nuclear power but discourage or prohibit closed nuclear fuel cycles. Such a regime could provide a key building block in a comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation strategy, promote the development of peaceful nuclear energy and institute automatic consequences for non-compliance with IAEA safeguards. There is an urgent need to continue efforts to tighten export control regimes and understand and accommodate rather than confront threshold states. Iran is one nation that needs sensitive handling. Nothing will be gained by questioning Iran’s nuclear energy needs and military action against it will definitely be counter-productive.

Early consensus on concluding the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty will be an important step forward. For counter-proliferation, international support is needed for the PSI and CSI initiatives launched by the US. Wider consultation is always better than “go it alone” strategies. Above all else, there is need to accelerate efforts towards total universal nuclear disarmament. 27,000 nuclear warheads are 27,000 too many. It has to be understood by the P-5 that total nuclear disarmament is a zero sum game.

The writer is Additional Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.