A nuclear Pakistan - USA Trying To Cope With A Recurrent Headache

Sankar Sen
The Statesman, 5 December

The turmoil in Pakistan is causing great concern in the USA, India and many other countries. The present government is not stable and the militant fundamentalists are in control of parts of the North West Frontier Province. If the situation deteriorates, the risk of the country’s nuclear assets falling into the hands of the terrorists is substantial.
Pakistan’s case is somewhat unique. It is the military that controls and takes decision on the nuclear weapons despite the constitutional provision on the inclusion of civilians in the decision-making process. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif are on record with the statement that they were excluded by the army whenever a decision was taken on nuclear weapons.

During the last 25 years Pakistan has developed an extensive nuclear complex. It has the capacity to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium or fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Its main uranium research facilities are at the AQ Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta. It also has another uranium research facility near Wah, which is called Gadwal Uranium Enrichment Plant. Pakistan also operates smaller enrichment facilities. According to an assessment of the Institute for Sciences and International Security, Pakistan at the end of 1999, possessed 585-800 kilograms of weapon grade HU and nearly 1.7-13 kilograms of separated plutonium. These quantities are sufficient for 30/50 nuclear bombs or warheads.

Storage facilities

Pakistan reportedly has several nuclear storage facilities. Their exact locations are unknown but they are mainly in the military bases. Its nuclear weapons are not thought to be “one-point safe” and equipped with Permissive Action Links meant to prevent unauthorised use of such nuclear weapons. A code has to be entered before such a weapon can be armed and fired.

President Musharraf has said that Pakistan is aware of the responsibilities of its nuclear status and that its nuclear arsenals are secure. The operational security of nuclear arsenals is now the responsibility of General Khalid Kidwai. According to him, Pakistan possesses both enabling and authenticating codes to protect the nuclear weapons. This may mean the development of rudimentary capability for nuclear warheads. It could even mean a locking delivery system.

In 2001, when the USA came to know that Pakistani scientists shared secrets of nuclear technology with Al Qaida, the Bush administration responded by providing millions of dollars of equipment such as American detectors and systems to safeguard Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. But Pakistan remained suspicious of the USA’s aims and did not grant US experts access to those bunkers where components of its arsenals are stored.

However, Pakistan’s nuclear assets remain vulnerable for a number of reasons. One important feature of its nuclear infrastructure is that much of it has been deployed to the west of the country to extend the warning time in the event of possible Indian attacks against the infrastructure and to delay an overrun from the ground. as an unintended consequence of this position, much of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure is located close to the volatile region to the west and north-west of Islamabad. The infrastructure thus remains vulnerable. There can be threats from terrorists groups though they have not made an organised effort to take possession of nuclear weapons or components or even to create a radiological hazard by engulfing nuclear components in a fire or an explosion. This may happen when their strength and influence increases.
Concern has been expressed over the stability of Pakistan’s army. There are fears that the army may not remain a loyal and cohesive force if violence escalates and the fundamentalists devise fresh strategies. Many young army officers of the post-Zia-ul-Haq era have been “Islamised”. The “beard count” within the armed forces has increased considerably.

Further, the military and intelligence services in Pakistan have for several decades had strong links with terrorist groups, particularly the Al Qaida and the Taliban. The radical Islamic sentiments of Pakistani soldiers is reflected in the Tanzimul-Ikhwana movement. Based in a madrasa 90 miles from Islamabad, the organisation comprises retired army personnel. The movement is led by Mohammad Akram Awan, who preaches radical Islamic reforms within Pakistan and enjoys the loyalty of many army officers and solders.

The army is not as professional and loyal as it was earlier thought to be. The Jamat-e-Islam has members of the defence personnel as well. Military and Intelligence officers were involved in assassination attempts on Musharraf. There have been cases of army officers acting in cahoots with the Al Qaida operatives. Indeed, leakage of nuclear technology from Pakistan, according to David Albright, president of the Institute for Sciences and International Security, is fairly confirmed.

Sections of the army are demoralised. Many soldiers have surrendered to the militants. There is a grouse at the level of certain sections that they are fighting against their own countrymen at the behest of the USA. The presence of American and NATO troops in Afghanistan strengthens that feeling.

Pakistan has so far witnessed four successful military coups. In the coup of 1969 one military leadership replaced the other. In the context of a deteriorating situation in Pakistan, a counter-coup could be staged by a group of army officers hostile to the west. There is also the possibility of a smaller group of anti-western officers mounting an attack on the nuclear weapon sites and taking possession of nuclear weapons or weapon components for political or ideological advantage.

Not disclosed

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, has stated that her country has contingency plans to deal with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into unauthorised hands. Obviously, the specifics of the plan have not been disclosed. There is speculation that the USA has plans to destroy or to take physical possession of the nuclear weapons. However, this seems highly improbable, if not dangerous. There is a US intelligence network operating within Pakistan’s armed forces. It has not disclosed to the USA all aspects of its nuclear weapons security planning. If Pakistan fears that an attack is imminent it will be able to disperse and hide some of its nuclear assets.

Removing nuclear weapons alone will not be enough. Only heavy bombing of the nuclear sites will fully neutralise them. Such attacks are bound to release a large quantity of radiation. Only appropriate and adequate measures can avoid such catastrophic situations. And the Army’s assistance is essential in this task.

According to John Brennan, a retired CIA official, Pakistan’s nuclear safeguards are “robust enough to withstand a fair amount of political commotion, but none can really predict what will happen if the country slides towards civil war.”

The author is former Director-General, National Human Rights Commission, former Director, National Police Academy, and Senior Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences