CRIMSON CORRIDOR

The objective is to establish a “compact revolutionary zone” in the heart of India and use this zone for extending the Naxalite movement to the cities and ultimately to seize the power structure of the states.

JAGMOHAN
The Statesman, April 1

IN the last few days, four major events have occurred which show how gravely is India’s internal security imperilled by the rising tide of Naxal violence. On 15 March, about 56 policemen of Chhattishgarh were killed in an attack on a base-camp in the Bastar region. Rocket launchers, detonators and petrol bombs were extensively used. Clearly, the attack was carried out after meticulous planning and with military precision. A few days earlier, JMM Member of Parliament Sunil Kumar Mahato was murdered in broad daylight. In January-February this year, a month long ninth-party Congress was held in a “liberated zone” along the Jharkhand-Bihar border. About three months ago, a landmine explosion in Bokaro district caused the death of 13 police personnel. The tragic incidents of this nature would continue to happen, unless the basic structure of the current Naxal movement and the nature of the forces sustaining it are fully understood and accounted for in the government strategy.

The Naxalites are presently much better organised, much better led and much better motivated than in the 1960’s when they burst like a “spring thunder” in the Naxalbari area of West Bengal. At that time, they were over possessed by the romantic and revolutionary slogans of Maoism, such as “power flows from the barrel of the gun” and “a single spark can start a prairie fire”. They declared all landlords, big or small, and all bourgeoise, powerful or petty, as class enemies and worked for their elimination by violent means. They were led by a brilliant but impulsive leader, Charu Mazumdar, who was swept off his feet by a few successful adventures and accompanying publicity. He talked of a “great upsurge” and boasted that “every corner of India was becoming inflammable”. His domineering attitude alienated the senior members and led to faction-fighting. The movement soon petered out, particularly after Charu Majumdar’s death in 1972.

Now the position is different. Both in policy and strategy, the Naxal movement has undergone a shift. Since 1990s, it has been gaining strength. The most significant change, however, occurred in September 2004, when the major groups - Maoist Communist Centre and People’s War Group - which cover about 90 per cent of the activities engendered by the movement, merged to form a united outfit called CPI (Maoist). An armed wing, the Peoples’ Liberation Guerrilla Army, was also raised. Before their merger, there was a lot of violent infighting between these groups, and a number of their cadres were killed from both sides. This period is now called by the Naxalites as “the black chapter in the history of Indian revolution”.

The programme of the CPI (Maoist) has been christened as New Democratic Revolution. It underlines that the new strategy is one of protracted armed struggle whose objective is not seizure of land, crops or other immediate goals, but the seizure of the state power. Within this perspective, participation in elections and engagements with the prevailing bourgeoise democracy are rejected, and all efforts and attention are firmly focused on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power. The struggle against “feudalism, imperialism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism” is reiterated in the programme which also make it clear that the party would support the struggle of nationalities for the self-determination, including the right to secession, and would pay special attention to mobilising and organising women as a mighty force of revolution. The unity of various groups, and the renewed enthusiasm of the leaders and their recognition of the damage done in the past by faction-fighting and group clashes have pushed the Naxalite movement in a stronger phase. A few other factors have also helped it to acquire a new impetus and a new sense of purpose.

There is a widespread impression amongst the rural poor that the economic policies, initiated in 1991 and enshrined in globalisation, marketisation and deregulation, are inimical to their interests and are basically hegemonic and imperialistic in nature. The newly acquired prosperity of their perceived enemies ~ landlords, bourgeois traders and bureaucrats ~ further annoys and frustrates them. And this helps the Naxalites to enlist more recruits for their movement. Secondly, whatever be the benefits of the Panchayati Raj in theory, the system, as it actually operates at the ground level, is placing more power in the hands of a comparatively well-to-do class of peasants, thereby further alienating the landless and the poor who then show little hesitation in moving to the fold of the Naxalites. Thirdly, the Naxalites have rapidly transformed themselves into a modern guerrilla force. They no longer depend upon country-made pistols. They now possess sophisticated communication system and weapons - AK 47, grenades, rocket launchers, land mines etc. They have a militia of about 25,000 persons - well-trained and well-motivated. All this has added immensely to the striking power of the Naxalites.

The increased strength of the movement should be evident from a series of serious incidents that have occurred recently. To give just one example, on 13 November 2005, about 1000 disciplined members of the Naxal cadre participated in a well-planned and well-conducted night attack on Jahanabad, which is barely 50 km from Patna, the state headquarters. They virtually established their rule in the city for several hours. They freed 340 prisoners from the jail, including their comrades and their leader, Ajay Kanu. They also killed two leaders of the Ranveer Sena, lodged in the same jail. The mass-support of the rural hinterland of Jahanabad to them was obvious, and there was hardly any resistance from the city, wherein the attacks on the jail, police lines and offices of the district administration were carried out simultaneously.

Earlier, on 6 February 2004. a group of 200 Naxalites swooped upon the district armoury at Koraput and took away 500 weapons. About 250 males and 50 females members of the Naxal cadre suddenly descended on the Karnataka police state camp on 11 February 2005 and killed six policemen and looted 10 rifles. In the same manner, about 300 Naxalites attacked Madhuban, Bihar, and shot dead five policemen and plundered arms as well as money from the post and a nationalised bank. In an another raid on the Home Guard Training Centre, Girdih, Jharkhand, about 200 weapons were looted. On 3 December 2006, 14 policemen of the Special Task Force were killed in a landmine blast. There have been many other incidents of similar nature, involving borders of Naxalites. Clearly, the new strategy is to pit the police against the masses who have, rightly or wrongly, been made to believe that they are victims of injustices and inequities. It also aims at frightening all those who, like Sunil Kumar Mahato and the members of the Salwa Judium, might dare to organise people against the movement.

No wonder, the movement has gained momentum. From 156 districts in 13 states in September 2004, the Naxal violence spread to 170 districts in 15 states in February 2005. According to reports of the Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, at present, about 40 per cent of the geographical area of the country and 35 per cent of its population is affected by the Naxal violence. The red corridor, extending from the jungles of North Bihar to Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhatisgarh, Andhra, Maharashtra and Karnataka, is fast emerging. This is what the ministry of home affairs’ annual report, 2004-05, acknowledges: “Despite strenuous efforts by the security forces, there has been no letup in the effectuation of CRZ with the gaps in North Bihar and North Chhattisgarh being steadily plugged by the Naxalite outfits to link up their strongholds in AP/ Dandakaranya with those in Bihar/ Jharkhand. Coupled with the steadily increasing Naxalite influence in North Orissa/ South East Jharkhand, it is apparent that the Naxalite group remain steadfast in their efforts to realise the CRZ.”

The objective is to establish a “compact revolutionary zone” in the heart of India and use this zone and the red corridor for extending the Naxalite movement to the cities and ultimately to seize the power structure of the states. The ultimate goal is the establishment of the Maoist state, no matter how many bones are broken and how much blood is spilled in the process.

The Politics Of The Vote-Bank Vis-a-vis The Naxalites

How could national security be safeguarded and the country spared of bloodshed and brutality? A number of measures could be suggested. On account of space-constraint, however, I would spell out here only two of these suggestions, one relating to politics and the other to economy. The state governments which are covered by the compact revolutionary zone and through which the red corridor passes must make an effective institutional arrangement to coordinate police action against the Naxalites. Intelligence should be shared and, wherever necessary, joint operations launched. Special squads of personnel trained to operate in forests and hilly areas and suitably equipped to counter guerrilla tactics should be raised by each of the affected states. Experience has shown that wherever special units have been set up and trained squads put in operation over a sufficiently long period of time, the outcome has been encouraging. Narrow political calculations, of course, have to be kept at bay. It is unfortunate that the excellent results achieved by Andhra Pradesh’s special units were frittered away on account of petty politics of the vote-bank.

New strategy

On the eve of elections to the state assembly and Parliament, with a view to securing the support of Naxalites, promises to declare a “cease-fire” and hold negotiations with them were made by a leading national party. After coming to power, both at the central and state levels, prolonged negotiations were held with the Naxal leaders who were allowed to keep their weapons and make even a show of them. All this infused new life in the movement. By the time the negotiations ended without any agreement or understanding, the Naxalites had regrouped and re-equipped themselves, gained fresh confidence and evolved a new strategy of action at the ground level.

The politics of the vote-bank vis-a-vis the Naxalites has not been played for the first time. In 1982, NT Rama Rao played it with consummate skill. He called the Naxalites true patriots who had been misunderstood by the ruling classes. By 1985, however, he was forced to take action against them. M Chenna Reddy, Congress chief minister, acted no differently. In 1989, he, too, declared that the Naxalites were patriots, When chief minister N Chandrababu Naidu adopted a firm approach against Naxalites, it was Rajasekhar Reddy’s turn to appease them. In other states, too, political parties and individual leaders have not hesitated to arrive at an understanding of mutual help with the Naxalites. This has enabled the latter to carve out an unhindered space for their activities, while the former have been getting electoral support of the Naxal cadre at the time of elections. This mutual understanding has been widely noticed in Bihar and Jharkhand.

It is, indeed, unfortunate that short-term political gains are often given precedence over the need for having a clear, consistent and firm line. An apolitical and coordinated approach of central and state governments concerned, their special police units and trained squads are absolutely necessary. Otherwise, the Naxalites would continue to believe that they are pursuing a “tottering foe”. On the economic front, an equally strong and sustained campaign needs to be launched to relieve the rural distress which, of late, has assumed serious proportions. A recent national survey has revealed that about 33 per cent of India’s population, that is, about 200 million ruralites, live on only Rs 12 a day. They spend as much as 70 per cent of their income on food and cannot afford to buy nutrition like green vegetables. About 36 million young people between the ages of 15 and 29 years are “usually unemployed”; on some days, as many as 58 million remain without work. Hundreds of peasants in debt are committing suicide and thousands of poor ruralites are also getting displaced consequent to their lands being taken for development projects. In these circumstances, anger and frustration of the poor and their attraction for a movement are understandable.

It speaks volumes about the failure of the Indian polity, Indian leaderships and Indian social and cultural values of the post-1947 period that a very large number of people in the country should still be grinded by hunger and haunted by unemployment every day, while millions of others get more and more affluent and are sucked into the orbit of consumerism. The Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme may provide some relief to the hungry and the unemployed. But a more fundamental, a more long-term plan, conceived with a new vision for future India, needs to be formulated and implemented.

A closer link needs to be established between urban, semi-urban and rural areas. A planned process of de-ruralisation and simultaneous urbanisation, industrialisation, and “service-isation” should be initiated. It should be ensured that those who are displaced from the rural areas consequent to the execution of the development projects are absorbed in those very projects and given pre-service and in-service training to acquire requisite skills and improve them further. The monetary compensation received by the claimants should be invested in the company in the form of shares with a guaranteed return equivalent to the amount of compensation. This would provide four-fold benefits. First, the risk of compensation-money being squandered would be eliminated. Secondly, the recipient, by virtue of his investment, would develop an interest in the advancement of the company. Thirdly, in the event of failure of the company, the rock-bottom amount would be available to the investors of this category. Fourthly, the erstwhile ruralite would become a skilled person, and if he seizes the opportunity to further upgrade his skills, a brighter future would be opened to him and his family.

Above all, it must be fully understood by the Indian society and the state that the Naxal movement is inherently dangerous and destructive. It can do no real good to any class of people. It can result in giving to India merely a blood-soaked grammar of anarchy. Its ideology is wholly imitative of the Chinese model of the thirties and forties of the last century and takes no account of the great many changes that have occurred all over the world in various spheres of life. It bewitches the poor by its catchy slogans and captures the impressionable minds by way of romantic and adventurous notions. It sets one class against another class, one caste against another caste, and often declares yesterday’s comrades as today’s police informers and traitors, deserving verbal trial and elimination.

The idea of India

Whatever may be professed in theory, in actual practice it has killed more poor “informers”, petty government officials and small businessmen and contractors. Equally nihilistic is the Naxalites’ attitude towards the idea of India, her underlying unity and her distinct culture. They advocate the right of the so-called nationalities of India to self-determination and secession, knowing full well that the exercise of such rights could only lead to unending divisions and discord and ultimate extinction of the Indian entity. Today, the Naxalite movement presents a huge challenge to India’s peace, security and overall well-being. The issues embedded in this challenge are many-sided and formidable. Nevertheless, they could be successfully tackled if the measures outlined above are taken in conjunction with the task of reforming the state and the society and the values underpinning them. But one thing that the governance machinery of India must fully grasp immediately is what Paul Wilkinson has underlined: “Rebellions do not generally fade away; they have to be put down, if normal life and business are to be restored.”

(The author is a former Governor of J & K and a former union minister)