Donkey fuel in oil-rich West Asia

Donanld Macintyre

It’s not surprising that the buyers at Thursday’s weekly donkey market at Shajaia in Gaza were looking over their prospective purchases with care. They opened the jaws of the tolerant beasts to examine their teeth, and test-drove them, harnessed to a cart, out of the crowded yard to gauge their pulling power.

“You need to make sure that it doesn’t kick people with its back legs, that it’s strong and that the colour of the coat is all right,” Mr Saber Dabour (25) said. He had just bought a donkey for 410 Jordanian dinars, or just under £ 290. For, while working donkeys have been bought and sold in Gaza since before Samson pulled down the Philistines’ temple, it is a long time since they have been as valuable as they are now. Prices have risen, traders said, by up to 60 per cent since Israel closed off the enclave after Hamas’ enforced takeover of Gaza Strip almost six months ago.

Donkey feed has gone up from five to 15 shekels (£1.95) a day since June. Mr Dabour has decided it makes sense to sell his car and buy the creature instead. The unemployed Mr Dabour has sold his car and now intends to use a donkey and cart to sell cucumbers, onions and other vegetables door to door. “There are no jobs here, so I am going to create my own work,” he said.

Pointing out that vehicle spare parts have dried up since the closure, Mr Dabour added: “A donkey doesn't need tyres, it doesn't need spare parts, and it doesn't need gasoline.”

The reduction in fuel supplies from Israel into Gaza, declared a “hostile entity” by the Israeli Cabinet in September in response to continued Qassam rocket fire, has quickened demand for donkeys as well as hitting water and sewerage provisions.

And the crisis this week, which led to the closure of petrol stations for several days, had led to a lower-than-usual 300 or so donkeys on sale in Shajaia on Thursday, according to a cart-maker, Mr Ashraf Kishko. Potential sellers were waiting to see how quickly fuel would return to the pumps.

Mr Kishko (40) said that with the added demand and the increased price of wood because of the closures, the carts he has been working overtime to turn out have also doubled in price, to about 120 dinars. “Without gasoline, people think it best to buy a donkey,” he said. “We are going back to the period of the Turks.”

Mr Kishko’s reference to the last occupation of Gaza but three, which ended in 1917, is not an idle one. In Shajaia, a suburb east of Gaza City, only a few kilometres from an Israeli border on the other side of which new Toyotas and Daihatsus cruise on smooth first-world roads, the market displays the early signs of what some economists call “de-development”.

While no doubt accelerated by Israel’s June closure of the Karni cargo crossing, it is a process that started well before it. Like many Gazans over 30, Mr Fathi abu Amra (34) used to have a construction job in Israel before the second intifada began in 2000. Now he was intending to buy one of the donkeys in Shajaia, the best of which he claims can fetch up to 600 dinars, for probable resale at another weekly donkey market in Khan Yunis. Donkey carts there are used to transport fresh water, among much else.

“You will always find someone to buy,” he said. “Everyone is using them for buying and selling things like vegetables,” many of which are at rock-bottom price because of the block on exports to and through Israel. A few metres away, Mr Abed Shehadah (62), who also used to work in Israel, was hoping to sell a white juvenile donkey, which he had bred, for about 250 dinars to help provide for his extended family.

The fuel crisis which came to a head this week followed a dramatic cut in supplies to Gaza from Israel to what the Gaza Petrol Station Owners' Association claimed was little more than 20 per cent of its normal daily needs of petrol and diesel fuel. Many Gaza streets were emptied of cars and taxis. Then the association’s 30 members with private petrol stations refused to accept the reduced supplies in protest at the cuts.

The new cut followed the failure by the emergency West Bank Palestinian government in Ramallah, set up in June by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, to pay fuel bills to the Israeli supplier Doron. By Thursday, the payment issue was resolved and the owners had called off their sales “strike”.

A spokesman for the Israeli military's civil administration said on Thursday that fuel supplies being moved represented only a five per cent reduction in “heavy diesel” and 12 per cent in petrol. But those figures are heavily challenged by aid agencies who say that, despite an Israeli Cabinet decision in October to reduce fuel by only 15 per cent, the diesel levels have since dropped from the usual 300-320,000 litres a day to 190,000, petrol from 80-100,000 to 47,000, and industrial fuel, including for the solitary Gaza power station, from 280,000 to 250,000.
Agencies say the fuel cuts have affected solid-waste treatment and left 220,000 Gaza residents without running water for more than one hour a day. This is both because of the depth of the cuts and the failure of the de facto Hamas government adequately to prioritise allocation of the reduced supplies.

A Gaza petrol station owner and Fatah supporter, Mr Nabil Nasser, criticised Hamas on Thursday for not meeting Mr Abbas’ demand that it renounces its June takeover as a condition for a reconciliation with its rivals. But he added: “Israel is not hurting Hamas with these cuts. They are not affected. It is we the people who are suffering.”

The Independent

Mideast conference - Mr Bush Takes A Major Initiative

Salman Haidar
The Statesman, 6 December

Finally, in its last year, the Bush Administration has undertaken a peace initiative in the Middle East. Until this point, it had remained conspicuously detached while the unsolved problems of the region simmered and occasionally erupted in strife and tension, adding further burdens to the already overburdened lives of the local people, especially the Palestinians. US quiescence meant that Israel remained virtually unchecked while it embarked upon a series of measures, including military strikes, against Arab targets, like assaults on persons believed to be Hamas activists in Gaza, with civilian bystanders often caught in the fire.

We were also obliged to witness the last months of Yasser Arafat besieged by Israeli armour in a crumbling redoubt in Ramallah. A massive wall came up to divide Israel from Palestine, encroaching openly on Palestinian lands. Even severe military action between Israel and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon did not procure early diplomatic intervention by the UN owing to US reluctance: many lives had to be lost and much damage done before that took place.

The quicksands

With these and other incidents, great and small, it seemed evident that the Bush Administration had no intention of plunging into the Middle East in any serious way. Earlier US Presidents had made their respective bids, most recently Mr Clinton, but Mr Bush was not inclined, it seemed, to enter the Middle East quicksands. Yet now, as the lights begin to dim and the campaign to elect the next incumbent takes centre stage, a major initiative has been taken by him to revive talks between Israel and the Palestinians, and to address other regional questions that remain troublingly unresolved. A two-day conference under US auspices brought the principals together at Annapolis. While deliberately short of the pomp and circumstance of a great international occasion, it was nevertheless a major diplomatic initiative by Mr Bush, who was himself noticeably in the foreground. The leaders of Israel and Palestine were there, as well as senior representatives of other Arab countries, especially significant among them being Syria and Saudi Arabia, who were persuaded to attend even though they have no relations with Israel. The conference was bulked out by adding representatives of several organisations and countries, including India. It was carefully prepared, the Secretary of State herself undertaking the task of bringing the protagonists together through an extended series of visits to the region, and by prolonged talks and persuasion. There is no mistaking the scale of the US effort. While this late initiative has received a considerable welcome, it is not clear why it was pursued at this juncture. The well-known problems of the Middle East may continue to bubble beneath the surface but the region is relatively calm at present. Nor can there be any expectation of a quick or simple outcome to Arab-Israeli issues, to provide a diplomatic bouquet to send off a departing Administration. It would not take much for either side, if it fears disappointment, merely to go through the motions and wait for a new President to arrive in Washington. So to take the steps it has now done is a considerable act of commitment on the part of the present Administration. Perhaps even at this late stage it feels the need to contribute as best it can to easing the chronically dangerous Middle East situation.

In view of the intense preparatory work, expectations had been building up as the conference convened. Some leading experts were of the view that this was a real opportunity for the elusive two-state solution to emerge, and with it permanent peace in the Middle East. Many issues divide the parties, among them the boundary question, the status of Jerusalem, including special arrangements for the Old City where the holy places of three religions are to be found, the refugee problem, which could be among the most difficult, and arrangements to assure Israel’s security. This is a big and complex agenda which is not to be solved in a single meeting. Hence the best that could be expected from the conference was that it would restart the negotiations and put them on a track that stretches out ahead, probably beyond the term of the current White House incumbent.

At the same time, everyone recognised that the difficulties were not to be underrated. Within the region itself, the Hamas group, which now controls Gaza, dissociated itself from the proceedings and said it did not recognise the credentials of Mr Mahmoud Abbas as the Palestinian spokesperson.

In Israel, Right-wing groups staged large-scale protests to underline their fear that undue concessions might be made by Prime Minister Olmert, who has no end of political troubles to face at home. Thus neither of the chief protagonists has a strong domestic base that could encourage bold action in the negotiations.

In the event, the conference delivered as much as could be expected. A process of talks between Palestine and Israel has been initiated. The hope has been expressed that the outlines of a full peace deal may be shaped by the end of 2008, by the time Mr Bush’s term comes to an end. All outstanding issues are on the table, for there are complex inter-linkages between the many outstanding issues.

The leaders of the two states chiefly concerned made guarded but basically affirmative remarks when the meeting ended. Mr Abbas drew particular attention to the need to talk about the status of Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital, and about the future of the refugees. Mr Olmert said Israel would make compromises for peace.

Central role

The venues, timings and other details of the impending talks have not been spelt out and it seems that the parties themselves will be in charge of such matters, in contrast to past meetings at Camp David, where the US President was actively involved. However, in recognition of the obvious reality that US good offices are indispensable, Mr Bush has moved swiftly to appoint a special envoy to the talks: no doubt his role will be central.

With a negotiating process now initiated between Israel and Palestine, the Annapolis conference achieved what seems to have been its principal objective. Bringing Syria and Saudi Arabia into it was a considerable achievement in itself. But there is no room for any complacency, and the conference hosts have been careful not to build false expectation. There is a long history of failure in Israel-Arab talks, so one must be cautious while assessing the prospects this time.

Moreover, even if the two principals should be willing to make progress, their cause may fall foul of the wider problems of the region: the situation in Lebanon, Iraq or Iran could flare up and derail the talks. Yet with all the caveats, something useful has been done, bringing with it a mild revival of expectation.

(The author is India’s former Foreign Secretary)

Bush's real agenda in Palestine

Ramzy Baroud*
Al Ahram Weekly, 26 July - 1 August

While Bush may be calling for peace conferences, the US policy of unequivocal bias towards Israel and attacking all that defend Arab and Palestinian rights is as firm as ever.

The Hamas government crackdown on Mohamed Dahlan's corrupt security forces and affiliated gangs in the Gaza Strip in June appears to mark a turning point in the Bush administration's foreign policy regarding Palestine and Israel. The supposed shift, however, is nothing but a continuation of Washington's efforts to stifle Palestinian democracy, to widen the chasm separating Hamas and Fatah, and to ensure the success of the Israeli project, which is focussed on colonising and annexing what remains of Palestinian land.

It's vital that we keep this seemingly obvious reality at the forefront of any political discussion dealing with the conflict: the occupied Palestinian territories represent a mere 22 per cent of historic Palestine. Currently, Israel is on a quest to reduce this even further by officially conquering the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem. Gaza is only relevant to this issue insofar as it represents a golden opportunity to divide Palestinians further, to confuse their national project and to present a grim picture of them as an unruly people who cannot be trusted as peace partners to the far more civilised and democratic Israelis.

By prolonging Gazan strife, thus the Palestinian split, Israel will acquire the time required to consolidate its colonial project, and to further rationalise its unilateral policies vis-à-vis matters that should, naturally, be negotiated with the Palestinians.

Moreover, one must not lose sight of the regional context. The Israeli lobby and its neo- conservative allies in the US administration and in the media are eager for a military showdown with Iran, which would weaken Syria's political standing in any future negotiation with Israel in regards to the occupied Golan Heights, and which would obliterate the military strength of Hizbullah, proven to be the toughest enemy Israel has ever faced in its decades-long conflict with the Arabs.

Thus, its was of paramount importance for Hamas's "rise" to be linked directly to its relations with Iran; such ties, although greatly exaggerated, are now readily used as a rationale to explain Bush's seemingly historic move from backing Israel from a discreet distance (so as not to appear too involved) to initiating an international peace conference aimed solely at isolating Hamas, which would further weaken the Iranian camp in the Middle East.

It also explains the abundant support offered by autocratic Arab regimes to Abbas, and Arab leaders' warnings about the rise of an Iranian menace. On the one hand, eliminating Hamas would send an unambiguous message to their own political Islamists; on the other, it's a message to Iran to back off from a conflict that has long been seen as exclusively Arab-Israeli. The irony is that to ensure the relevance of the Arab role in the conflict, some Arabs are making historic moves to normalise with Israel, and in return for nothing.

Similarly, to ensure its own relevance, Abbas's Fatah is actively coordinating with Israel to destroy its formidable opponent, which represents the great majority of Palestinians in the occupied territories and arguably abroad. For this, assistance is required: money to ensure the loyalty of his followers, weapons to oppress his opponents, political validation to legitimise himself as a world leader, and new laws to de-legitimise the legal, democratic process that produced the Hamas victory of January 2006. In a conflict that is known for its agonisingly slow movement, nothing short of a miracle can explain how Abbas received all of these perks at an astronomical speed.

The moment Abbas declared his arguably unconstitutional emergency government, the suffocating sanctions were lifted -- or more accurately, on the West Bank only. To ensure that no aid reaches anyone who defies his regime, Abbas's office revoked the licences of all NGOs operating in Palestine, making it necessary for them to submit new applications. Those loyal to Abbas are in. The rest are out.

Weapons and military training have also arrived in abundance. Palestinians who have been denied the right to defend themselves, and for decades described as "terrorist", are suddenly the recipients of many caches of weapons coming from all directions. Israel announced a clemency to Fatah militants; the freedom fighters turned gangsters will no longer defend their people against Israeli brutality, but will be used as a militant arm ready to take on Hamas when the time comes.

As for regional and international legitimacy, the Bush administration "decided" to change its policy to one of direct engagement, calling for an international Middle East peace conference. The conference will be about peace in name only, for it will not deal with any of the major grievances of the Palestinians that have fuelled the conflict for years, such as the problem of refugees, Jerusalem and the drawing of borders. Israel is of course willing to "concede" if these efforts will reframe the conflict as exclusively Palestinian, and as long as there is no objection to its illegal annexation of Palestinian land in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

The reality is that there has been no change in American foreign policy regarding Palestine. The US, Israel and a few Arab regimes are pursuing the same old policy, which is merely being adjusted to fit the new political context.

While Abbas and his men might bask in the many bonuses they are receiving in exchange for their role in destroying the Palestinian national project, the future will prove that Israel's "goodwill gestures", the support of the Israeli lobby in Washington, and the latter's generosity will not last. Abbas could as easily find himself a prisoner in the basement of his own presidential compound, just like his predecessor, if he dares assert the legitimate rights of his people, by far the ultimate losers in this shameless battle.

* The writer is author of The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle and editor-in-chief of PalestineChronicle.com.

Turkey and Iran look beyond energy ties

Atul Aneja
The Hindu, August 4

Despite their rivalry in Central Asia, once the momentum for a positive relationship develops, Turkey and Iran could find it

easier to manage their differences in

this resource rich region.


Entering his second term in office after winning the recent parliamentary elections, Turkey’s charismatic Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is set to redraw his country’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. On the home front, Mr. Erdogan, the leader of the Justice and Development (AK) party, has an unfinished battle at hand with the Turkish military top brass. His uneasy relationship with the military, the guardian of secularism, as defined by Turkey’ s founding patriarch, Kemal Ataturk, acquired high visibility at the end of his first term in office. Tensions between the military and the civilian establishment peaked when the two clashed over the choice of the next President. The AK party, which has Islamic roots, nominated Abdullah Gul as its candidate. The military rejected his name as it did not consider Mr. Gul a worthy symbol of Turkish secularism. Among other things, the military, steeped in Kemalist tradition, objected to his wife wearing a headscarf.

The deadlock over the Presidency forced Mr. Erdogan to call for fresh elections, four months ahead of schedule. But now that the AK party has won with a significant margin, the stage has been set for another round of sparring, if not worse, between Turkey’s moderate Islamists and the military elite.

A confrontation between the military and the civilian establishment can become messy. The armed forces leadership does recognise Mr. Erdogan’s high popularity, and this should encourage it to work out a compromise with the elected leadership. Nevertheless, restraint has not been the Turkish military’s hallmark. The military has twice toppled civilian governments, engineering coups in 1960 and 1980. In 1997, it forced the resignation of the government led by Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan for his perceived anti-secular moorings.

In the foreign policy arena, Turkey remains anchored to the western North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It also has a special relationship with the United States. But despite its traditional pro-American leanings, Turkey has guarded its national interest zealously even at the cost of sometimes annoying its allies. When the Americans decided to invade Iraq, no amount of pressure or inducements succeeded in persuading Turkey to allow U.S. forces to pass through its territory. The Turkish refusal prevented the Americans from opening a much-needed northern front in Iraq.

Of late, the Turks have shown a greater propensity to “look east.” This has been largely driven by the reluctance of the European Union (EU) to permit Turkey entry into its fold. Voicing the growing frustration among of Turks with the Europeans, Ata Atun, a columnist with the Turkish daily Zaman, wrote recently that “perhaps Turkey does not really need Europe after all and the EU will come to regret its insultingly complacent chauvinism as Turkey goes its own way —– facing eastward.”

As part of its look east policy, Turkey has reached out to Iran in a big way. On July 13, Tehran and Ankara arrived at an understanding on gas supplies. Under a preliminary agreement, two separate pipelines from Iran and its Central Asian neighbour, Turkmenistan, will supply gas to Turkey. Part of the 30 billion cubic metres of gas, which will be exported annually, will be used by Turkey. The rest will be transferred to Europe.

This agreement promises to revive the ambitious Nabucco pipeline project, which the EU supports. The 3,300-km Nabucco pipeline envisages annual transportation of 30 billion cubic metres of gas from Turkey to Austria through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Construction for this pipeline is expected to begin in 2008. It is likely to be commissioned three years later.

The deal with Iran also envisages $3.5 billion of Turkish investment for the development of three gas wells in Iran’s giant South Pars field. Iran wants to develop the South Pars as the source for feeding gas to markets in Europe as well as Asia, including Pakistan, India, and possibly China. The proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline will also draw gas from South Pars.

The Turkey-Iran energy tie-up has stunned the Americans who have been following a one-point agenda of isolating Iran. Soon after the deal was announced, Washington stated its objections bluntly. “It’s going to be up to the Turkish government [and] Turkish entities to decide whether or not they want to do business with Iran at this point in time,” State department spokesman Sean McCormack said. “If you ask our opinion, ‘do we think it is the right moment to be making investments in the Iranian oil and gas sector,’ no, we don’t think so.”

However, the Turks have thought through the implications of their move carefully, and appear prepared to withstand Washington’s displeasure. Dismissing the State Department’s remarks, Mr. Erdogan said the Iranian offer was “attractive” and that Turkey did not require U.S. “permission” to pursue its own interests.

Turkey’s firm stance is mainly attributed to the high stakes that are attached to this trans-continental venture. Once it materialises, Europe will finally have an assured supply of gas from a source other than Russia. The search for a non-Russian source was intensified after Moscow halted supplies to Ukraine in 2005. The crisis emerged during peak winter, because of Moscow’s differences with Kiev over gas prices. Europe fears that Russia could use its energy clout again to achieve its economic and political goals, in case it monopolises gas exports.

For Turkey, and especially Iran, the joint venture has major implications. It promises to firmly establish Ankara and Tehran as Europe’s strategic energy partners for a long time to come. Given Europe’s future dependence on Iranian gas, it can demolish Washington’s attempts to isolate Iran. Iran is also well aware that over time, a strong energy relationship with Europe is bound to have a positive impact on the EU’s stance towards Tehran’s nuclear programme.

Turkey, on its part, stands to gain substantially after entering into a gas deal with Iran. Apart from fulfilling its energy security requirements and accumulating revenues through transit fees, Turkey stands better positioned to seek full-fledged EU membership following its full integration into the European energy sector. There are other factors that bind Turkey and Iran. The Islamist affiliations of the AK party appear to have softened Iran’s stance towards Ankara. The Turkish government has acknowledged that the Iranians have stopped supporting rebels on its territory after the AK party first won elections in 2002.

The common enemy

Besides, both sides stand opposed to Kurdish separatism. In Turkey’s case, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) spearheads the Kurdish campaign, whereas in Iran, the Kurds are organised under the banner of the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK). The two groups reside in close geographical proximity. The PEJAK operates its base camp from the southern slopes of the Kandil mountains in neighbouring Iraq. The PKK headquarters are on the western side of these mountains. The Turks in recent weeks have been accusing the Iraqi government of inaction against PKK guerrillas operating from Iraqi soil. Thousands of Turkish troops have massed along the Turkey-Iraq border. Turkish leaders have threatened cross-border incursions to clear out the PKK sanctuaries if Baghdad and Washington fail to act. With Iran also confronting PEJAK, operating from the same area, there is a case for Turkey and Iran to enhance their security cooperation.

Notwithstanding their several common interests, Turkey and Iran have been competing for influence in Central Asia. Historically, the streams of Turkic and Persian linguistic and cultural influence have left their indelible mark in this region. Turkic languages are prevalent in Turkmenistan, Kyrghyzstan, and Uzbekistan. On the other hand, Tajiki, which is widely spoken in Tajikistan, and Pashto of Afghanistan have their roots in the Persian language. In the recent past, Turkey has been promoting pan-Turkism, by focussing on the Turkic-speaking people of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrghyzstan. Iran has also prioritised its relationship with Central Asia, where it sees Tajikistan as its natural ally. It is also vying for greater influence in Turkmenistan, establishing a direct rail link already. Simultaneously, it is strengthening energy ties with Ashgabat.

Despite their rivalry in Central Asia, it is not inconceivable that once the momentum for a positive relationship develops, Turkey and Iran — the inheritors of the great Ottoman and Persian empire — may find it easier to manage their differences in this resource rich region.

Continuing myopia in West Asia

Hamid Ansari
The Hindu, 12 March

The Palestinian quest for nationhood, the Iraqi endeavour to retrieve it, the Iranian determination to assert it. The impulses, in each case, contradict the imperatives of hegemonic regional or external power.

IN 1972 Henry Kissinger spelt out his approach to the Middle East question: "a prolonged stalemate that would move the Arabs towards moderation and the Soviets to the fringes of Middle East diplomacy." The second part of the recipe was successful over time; the first, however, produced the opposite of what was intended. It was only radical thought and action that moved America, then and later. The resulting dilemma has been disconcerting to the policy makers and damaging to their credibility. The Road Map of 2003, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, was one instance of it; the recent initiative by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in the face of looming disaster in Iraq, is another.
External power, neo-patriarchy, and suppressed aspirations are common ingredients in a complex and diverse picture. One result of it is the absence of tranquillity; another is the endless quest for new equations.

Governments tend to simplify matters by positing them in dichotomies that remain inadequate and inevitably overlap: conservative and progressive, tradition and modernity, moderate and radical. Forgotten in the process are notions of wisdom and justice.

Wisdom, wrote Abba Eban, is born only when illusions die. In the West Asian context, these illusions pertain principally to the denial of nationhood in three situations: the Palestinian quest for it, the Iraqi endeavour to retrieve it, the Iranian determination to assert it. The impulses, in each case, contradict the imperatives of hegemonic regional or external power.

In the case of Palestine, four decades of occupation have neither bestowed legitimacy on the occupying power nor has it crushed the Palestinian will to resist it. The electoral victory of Hamas and the Israeli bombing and blockade eventually resulted in a stalemate; the Palestinian empowerment was drained away in the internecine Fatah-Hamas conflict; the war with Hezbollah shattered the myth of military invincibility and damaged Israel psychologically and politically. Motives, altruistic and others, propelled the Saudi initiative and the resultant Makkah Agreement. Its brevity is indicative of the tension underlying it.

The inclusion, and exclusion, of specific issues mentioned in the last paragraph is reflective of the distance travelled by Hamas.

Nevertheless, the reluctance of Israel, the United States, and the European Union to accept it does not bode well for the revival of the peace process and may come to be viewed as another instance of an initiative emanating from a `moderate' Arab state being disowned. The International Crisis Group is right in asserting that the international community, and the Quartet, should see the Makkah Agreement "as an opportunity to revive the peace process, rather than as yet another excuse to bury it." Hopefully, there would be an evolution of perceptions by the time the Arab summit convenes in Riyadh later this month.

In Iraq, the deliberate destruction of the state structure impacted adversely on social cohesion. The process commenced in 1991 with the regime of sanctions and was analysed in depth among others by Sarah Graham-Brown. The social policies of Saddam Hussein, in the last decade of his rule, aggravated them. The temptation of pursuing a policy of divide and rule, however, was irresistible for the occupying power. Its consequences were not anticipated. The situation now has run out of control. The decision in the Saudi-Iranian summit on March 4 to discourage sectarian divide is a case of too little, too late since neither is in a position to control the cycle of frenzy, revenge, and anarchy that has been unleashed.

The decision of the U.S., after a delay of 12 precious months, to take part in talks involving all of Iraq's neighbours, is an admission of the viability of the only remaining course of action that might help salvage Iraq. The preparatory meeting, at the level of ambassadors, must lead to a higher level conclave where hard decisions could be taken. These decisions, inevitably, necessitate a revamping of the arrangements for the governance of Iraq that were so hastily incorporated in the new constitution.

Iran remains forbidding to the prudent and tantalising to the adventurous. Its domestic impulses, complex and in constant flux, hamper definitive judgments. Four distinguishing traits stand out: pride, nationalism, insecurity, and pragmatism. Each of these has come to the fore in the debate about the nuclear programme. The recent announcement about a new high denomination currency note, with a picture of the nuclear insignia of electrons in orbit around an atom and bearing a saying of the Prophet of Islam highly complimentary to the Persian genius, is indicative of the national pride involved in the enrichment argument. An attempt to crush it, even if moderately successful, would be counter productive.

An opportunity for diplomacy lies in the other two characteristics of the Iranian scene: insecurity and pragmatism. Despite protestations, isolation would be unpalatable and there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an alternate approach would make headway, albeit not without much haggling. A starting point for it could be International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei's assertion: "We at the IAEA lack conclusive evidence. We have yet to see a smoking gun that would convict Tehran. I can make assumptions about intentions, but I cannot verify intentions, only facts." If so, the case against Iran is yet to be proved, except in the court of prejudice.

It is now evident that the West Asian crises are interlinked and interdependent. Attempts at isolation and prioritisation have met with failure. Does not the gravity of the situation propel us towards an approach that is procedurally and qualitatively different?

A digression into the political philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau may help resolve the impasse. He commenced his enquiry into the Principles of Political Right with a teasing question: "whether, taking men as they are and laws as they can be made, it is possible to establish some just and certain rule of administration in civil affairs... To reconcile what right permits with what interest prescribes, so that justice and utility may not be severed." The prescription would hold good for contemporary West Asia if the words `civil affairs' are substituted by `international affairs' and the national interests of individual players balanced by considerations of justice.

Given the realities of power, this endeavour has to commence with the U.S. whose attempt at establishing primacy of unchallenged power has not only failed but has also resulted, as Anatol Lieven put it, "in a horrible moral and political mess." The effort now is to develop a revitalised alliance of regional surrogates. The latter, and many others, seek to have the more glaring causes of failure addressed, not piecemeal but altogether. They realise that moderation is often a function of satisfaction.

In practical terms, this would amount to forsaking the unilateral approach advocated by Kissinger in favour of a comprehensive initiative to seek viable solutions to the three nationhood impulses and would involve (a) a time-bound initiative by the Quartet and the EU to go beyond the termite-ridden Road Map of 2003 and ensure Final Status negotiations on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 and the Saudi-Arab League Plan of 2002; (b) an international conference on Iraq with the participation of all its neighbours; (c) commencement of nuclear negotiations with Iran, without the precondition of suspension of enrichment but with credible guarantees that such enrichment would not exceed the present levels; and (d) inclusion of Iran in a broader regional security dialogue on the Persian Gulf.

The present level of turbulence in West Asia is a matter of serious concern to the world beyond the region. India is close enough to be affected. An aggravation would impinge on essential national interests.

Would Indian diplomacy initiate, even at the risk of adjusting positions hitherto taken, a move for simultaneous and parallel movement on each of these questions?

The writer is a former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations.