Turkey and Iran look beyond energy ties

Atul Aneja
The Hindu, August 4

Despite their rivalry in Central Asia, once the momentum for a positive relationship develops, Turkey and Iran could find it

easier to manage their differences in

this resource rich region.


Entering his second term in office after winning the recent parliamentary elections, Turkey’s charismatic Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is set to redraw his country’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. On the home front, Mr. Erdogan, the leader of the Justice and Development (AK) party, has an unfinished battle at hand with the Turkish military top brass. His uneasy relationship with the military, the guardian of secularism, as defined by Turkey’ s founding patriarch, Kemal Ataturk, acquired high visibility at the end of his first term in office. Tensions between the military and the civilian establishment peaked when the two clashed over the choice of the next President. The AK party, which has Islamic roots, nominated Abdullah Gul as its candidate. The military rejected his name as it did not consider Mr. Gul a worthy symbol of Turkish secularism. Among other things, the military, steeped in Kemalist tradition, objected to his wife wearing a headscarf.

The deadlock over the Presidency forced Mr. Erdogan to call for fresh elections, four months ahead of schedule. But now that the AK party has won with a significant margin, the stage has been set for another round of sparring, if not worse, between Turkey’s moderate Islamists and the military elite.

A confrontation between the military and the civilian establishment can become messy. The armed forces leadership does recognise Mr. Erdogan’s high popularity, and this should encourage it to work out a compromise with the elected leadership. Nevertheless, restraint has not been the Turkish military’s hallmark. The military has twice toppled civilian governments, engineering coups in 1960 and 1980. In 1997, it forced the resignation of the government led by Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan for his perceived anti-secular moorings.

In the foreign policy arena, Turkey remains anchored to the western North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It also has a special relationship with the United States. But despite its traditional pro-American leanings, Turkey has guarded its national interest zealously even at the cost of sometimes annoying its allies. When the Americans decided to invade Iraq, no amount of pressure or inducements succeeded in persuading Turkey to allow U.S. forces to pass through its territory. The Turkish refusal prevented the Americans from opening a much-needed northern front in Iraq.

Of late, the Turks have shown a greater propensity to “look east.” This has been largely driven by the reluctance of the European Union (EU) to permit Turkey entry into its fold. Voicing the growing frustration among of Turks with the Europeans, Ata Atun, a columnist with the Turkish daily Zaman, wrote recently that “perhaps Turkey does not really need Europe after all and the EU will come to regret its insultingly complacent chauvinism as Turkey goes its own way —– facing eastward.”

As part of its look east policy, Turkey has reached out to Iran in a big way. On July 13, Tehran and Ankara arrived at an understanding on gas supplies. Under a preliminary agreement, two separate pipelines from Iran and its Central Asian neighbour, Turkmenistan, will supply gas to Turkey. Part of the 30 billion cubic metres of gas, which will be exported annually, will be used by Turkey. The rest will be transferred to Europe.

This agreement promises to revive the ambitious Nabucco pipeline project, which the EU supports. The 3,300-km Nabucco pipeline envisages annual transportation of 30 billion cubic metres of gas from Turkey to Austria through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Construction for this pipeline is expected to begin in 2008. It is likely to be commissioned three years later.

The deal with Iran also envisages $3.5 billion of Turkish investment for the development of three gas wells in Iran’s giant South Pars field. Iran wants to develop the South Pars as the source for feeding gas to markets in Europe as well as Asia, including Pakistan, India, and possibly China. The proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline will also draw gas from South Pars.

The Turkey-Iran energy tie-up has stunned the Americans who have been following a one-point agenda of isolating Iran. Soon after the deal was announced, Washington stated its objections bluntly. “It’s going to be up to the Turkish government [and] Turkish entities to decide whether or not they want to do business with Iran at this point in time,” State department spokesman Sean McCormack said. “If you ask our opinion, ‘do we think it is the right moment to be making investments in the Iranian oil and gas sector,’ no, we don’t think so.”

However, the Turks have thought through the implications of their move carefully, and appear prepared to withstand Washington’s displeasure. Dismissing the State Department’s remarks, Mr. Erdogan said the Iranian offer was “attractive” and that Turkey did not require U.S. “permission” to pursue its own interests.

Turkey’s firm stance is mainly attributed to the high stakes that are attached to this trans-continental venture. Once it materialises, Europe will finally have an assured supply of gas from a source other than Russia. The search for a non-Russian source was intensified after Moscow halted supplies to Ukraine in 2005. The crisis emerged during peak winter, because of Moscow’s differences with Kiev over gas prices. Europe fears that Russia could use its energy clout again to achieve its economic and political goals, in case it monopolises gas exports.

For Turkey, and especially Iran, the joint venture has major implications. It promises to firmly establish Ankara and Tehran as Europe’s strategic energy partners for a long time to come. Given Europe’s future dependence on Iranian gas, it can demolish Washington’s attempts to isolate Iran. Iran is also well aware that over time, a strong energy relationship with Europe is bound to have a positive impact on the EU’s stance towards Tehran’s nuclear programme.

Turkey, on its part, stands to gain substantially after entering into a gas deal with Iran. Apart from fulfilling its energy security requirements and accumulating revenues through transit fees, Turkey stands better positioned to seek full-fledged EU membership following its full integration into the European energy sector. There are other factors that bind Turkey and Iran. The Islamist affiliations of the AK party appear to have softened Iran’s stance towards Ankara. The Turkish government has acknowledged that the Iranians have stopped supporting rebels on its territory after the AK party first won elections in 2002.

The common enemy

Besides, both sides stand opposed to Kurdish separatism. In Turkey’s case, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) spearheads the Kurdish campaign, whereas in Iran, the Kurds are organised under the banner of the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK). The two groups reside in close geographical proximity. The PEJAK operates its base camp from the southern slopes of the Kandil mountains in neighbouring Iraq. The PKK headquarters are on the western side of these mountains. The Turks in recent weeks have been accusing the Iraqi government of inaction against PKK guerrillas operating from Iraqi soil. Thousands of Turkish troops have massed along the Turkey-Iraq border. Turkish leaders have threatened cross-border incursions to clear out the PKK sanctuaries if Baghdad and Washington fail to act. With Iran also confronting PEJAK, operating from the same area, there is a case for Turkey and Iran to enhance their security cooperation.

Notwithstanding their several common interests, Turkey and Iran have been competing for influence in Central Asia. Historically, the streams of Turkic and Persian linguistic and cultural influence have left their indelible mark in this region. Turkic languages are prevalent in Turkmenistan, Kyrghyzstan, and Uzbekistan. On the other hand, Tajiki, which is widely spoken in Tajikistan, and Pashto of Afghanistan have their roots in the Persian language. In the recent past, Turkey has been promoting pan-Turkism, by focussing on the Turkic-speaking people of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrghyzstan. Iran has also prioritised its relationship with Central Asia, where it sees Tajikistan as its natural ally. It is also vying for greater influence in Turkmenistan, establishing a direct rail link already. Simultaneously, it is strengthening energy ties with Ashgabat.

Despite their rivalry in Central Asia, it is not inconceivable that once the momentum for a positive relationship develops, Turkey and Iran — the inheritors of the great Ottoman and Persian empire — may find it easier to manage their differences in this resource rich region.