After the ‘deal’ what?

Jayanta Sarkar
The Statesman, 15 September

The India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement will in all probability go through, perhaps with a few scratches. Given the level of probity of our political leaders, the all-too-familiar gap between their public utterances and the ultimate knuckling under, and their lust for power at any cost, there is no reason to think of any other denouement. Today the deal has become the talk of the town the world over, and not for any right reason. This “deal” does not have that ennobling connotation of the “New Deal”. Nor does it have the innate strength of the deal of a fir tree. Nor the excitement of a new “deal” in a game of cards. And let us hope that it will not turn out to be one of those wheeler-dealer deals either!

Some people see in it something well beyond all this. Like Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. At a conference a few days ago, he aired his country’s anguish at the way it has been treated and, more so, at the way its neighbour has been treated. He said: “We believe a level playing field is required for all countries to have access to civilian nuclear technology without prejudice or discrimination.”

Pakistan might have been outsmarted but not outwitted as its PM affirmed: “With its high growth trajectory, is determined to meet its energy requirements from all available resources including nuclear energy.”

The Economist has written as much. It notes: “China, unhappy at America’s coddling of India, is exploring more nuclear cooperation with Pakistan - which in turn threatens to match India , should it step up weapons production or test again.” Yet, at the end of the day, Pakistan remains a bad loser.

It is possible that there was a race at some point and that started well before the George Bush-Manmohan Singh joint statement was made public in July 2005. Diplomatic Washington could have got wind of what was brewing, and that did not make Pakistan happy. If that was so, it also must have pulled all its punches to change the deal in its favour or at least to thwart it. But this time it failed. It was a race of sorts and once someone had won it, it also surrendered the option of backing out and saying: “Sorry, I withdraw”.

But India has a history of not getting into such blind alleys. A recent media report describes how Jawaharlal Nehru’s India resisted the US pressure to go for a nuclear test when Cold War was at its peak in the early 1960s on the ground that it would have gone against its policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. Indira Gandhi, a confirmed West-baiter, did nothing like it. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, media-labelled as mildly pro-West, kept away from any such deal. So did Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao.

So what could have happened this time? Could it have been that the present leadership feared that if India does not take it, then some other country across the border would lap it up and become a still worse thorn in the flesh? Or was it a case of not being able to steel the resolve sufficiently strongly to resist what could have been overarching pressure?

The Pakistani dignitary could as well have added that at present nuclear power remains a minor player in the global energy scene. Exceptions are France (where it contributes 78 per cent of total generation), Belgium (55 per cent), Sweden (52 per cent), Switzerland (40 per cent) and Japan (29 per cent). In the USA it is about 20 per cent which should now go up as it finally shakes off its nuclear sanyas forced by the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident in 1979. China and India are now planning big but will still have it around 10 per cent for quite some time. That is because they are also going to raise coal-based thermal power generation side by side.

Still another question is about its cost of generation. All kinds of figures are being branded about. The figures vary from one type of reactor to another. The project cost, the terms of payment for the feedstock, the operational ratio, and many other technical parameters decide the number. Some Opposition leaders claim it would not be less than Rs 5 to Rs 6 per unit (kilowatt hour). Others put it lower at Rs 2 to Rs 3 per unit. Much depends on the operational ratio. A US expert group, Global Energy Decisions, says when the nuclear plants in the US operated at around 98 per cent of their capacity during the recent summer months, the per unit cost came down to 1.72 cents (71 paise). But then few countries, and not certainly India, enjoy the kind of advantages that the US does. It will have to buy most of the uranium and make big payments for the equipment. And uranium prices are already rising fast and will rise further once the demand grows.

Some basic issues of the deal remain unresolved. What happens when India conducts a nuclear test? What exactly would be the content and extent of the so-called “India-specific” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards? Whether all the plants, both old and new, would be brought under IAEA inspection or only the new ones? Will the IAEA decision influence the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on offering uranium to India? How far will India be able to secure a firm commitment from the NSG on uranium supplies if India opts for certain types of reactors?

Speaking animatedly, Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar recently said India should get “clear, unconditional exemptions” from the NSG guidelines if it chooses to buy light water reactors under the 123 Agreement with the United States. He was in the Indian delegation that went to Washington when the two countries gave the finishing touches to the 123 text. The Kakodkar caveat could become a flashpoint after the deal is signed.

Rajiv Gandhi had worked on persuading the erstwhile Soviet Union to a plan to set up 10 units of 1,000 megawatt electrical (MWe) in a bid to boost this laggard sector. Starting with 420 MWe in 1970, the generation has inched up, MWe by MWe, to 3,400 MWe last year. But that initiative ended abruptly.

China in a sense has done better. It has been actively encouraging its nuclear establishment to develop its own technology and equipment. It is going ahead with small plants for which it has developed indigenous capability. Some of the first pressurised heavy water reactors in of a limited size in India had many components made by Indian companies. China is also working on building up a strategic uranium reserve.

In contrast, Kakodar, perhaps now a little chastened and unsure, has reiterated, for all that it is worth, that “We have to look at India’s interests… We should be able to carry on without interference. So there is a non-hindrance clause.” India’s “first priority”, he has told media persons, is to use thorium for generation of nuclear power. Will it become another cry in the wilderness?

(The author is former Resident Editor, The Economic Times, Kolkata)