A PRESIDENT RUNNING OUT OF ROOM TO MANOEUVRE - Pakistan: trying to please everybody

Le Monde diplomatique, February 2007

The United States has condemned the assistance the Taliban
receive from across the Pakistan border. President Pervez
Musharraf has announced the destruction of three training camps close to the frontier but, as elections approach, he is also trying to reach an accommodation with Islamist groups in Pakistan.

by Jean-Luc Racine

PAKISTAN'S voters will choose a new president, national
parliament and provincial assemblies this year. There are
doubts about how the three ballots will be conducted, and the
process also raises longstanding and fundamental questions
about the relationship between the military regime and the
parliamentary opposition. If General Pervez Musharraf is
re-elected as president, perhaps it is time for him to shed
his uniform and rehabilitate the democratic opposition and
its exiled leaders.

Some opposition MPs are Islamists who provide a
constitutional front for radical armed Islamists, in league
with the military, but targeted by Musharraf, who has
persistently called for "enlightened moderation" in the
service of a "progressive, dynamic Islamic state". Could this
relationship between the mullahs and the army develop? Its
complexity is increased by the involvement of radical
Pakistani Islamists in Kashmir and in the tribal areas on the
Afghanistan border where the Taliban are regaining ground.

The deteriorating situation in the western coastal province
of Baluchistan demonstrates the central government's
difficulties in dealing with inequalities between provinces;
and in reconciling internal affairs with wider regional
issues such as the international gas pipeline projects,
involving Iran and Afghanistan; or the new port at Gwadar,
intended to be China's gateway to the Indian Ocean.

The shadow of the United States falls over all this. It
constantly praises Musharraf's key role in the war on terror;
it also presses him to do more against al-Qaida and the
Taliban.

Musharraf, and many of those around him, argue the necessity
of not separating civil and military power precisely because
Pakistan faces all these internal and external challenges.
They insist that the president is the man to deal with the
situation and the army is the only body capable of effective
action. This view also finds favour among foreign political
leaders. But some Pakistani liberals, anti-Islamist
supporters of real parliamentary democracy, view the military
regime as part of the problem, not as a potential solution.
These are major challenges.

Jihad in Afghanistan

During the 1980s the Afghan war against Soviet occupation and
the Kashmiri rising against India allowed Pakistan to develop
an active regional policy intended to prevent it from being
squeezed between India and Afghanistan. As a frontline state
against the Soviet Union, Pakistan allowed the US to give
effective support to the mujahideen. After the Soviet defeat
in 1989 the mujahideen tore themselves apart and Pakistan's
influence was not decisive; Pakistan supported the Pashtun
Gulbaddin Hekmatyar against Ahmed Shah Massud's pro-Indian
Tajiks. The rise of the Taliban after 1994 offered fresh
opportunities. At the same time, Pakistani jihadists were
fighting in Indian Kashmir, boosting the insurrection and
bogging down much of the Indian army in a dirty war.

After 9/11 Musharraf soon understood the stakes in
Afghanistan and saw the risks of refusing the deal offered by
the Bush administration. He abandoned the Taliban (which
refused to expel or hand over Osama bin Laden) and signed up
to the war on terror. He shuffled his top brass, denounced
extremism and arrested hundreds of al-Qaida militants
including, in 2003, such senior figures as Khalid Sheikh
Muhammad, who had planned 9/11.

George Bush promoted Pakistan to the rank of "major non-Nato
ally" in 2004. But the US administration wanted more than
just Pakistan tracking down Bin Laden and Muhammad Omar. Both
the US and the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, blamed the
setbacks of Operation Enduring Freedom on the porosity of the
long, mountainous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Musharraf decided in 2004 to send troops to South Waziristan,
an agency in the federally administered tribal areas (Fata)
along the Afghan border. Guerrilla fighting ensued between
the army, which lost 800 out of 80,000 men, and militias --
Afghan Taliban, neo-Taliban from Pakistani tribes and
international al-Qaida combatants. The government reached
agreements with the local tribal chiefs in South Waziristan
in 2004 and 2005, and in North Waziristan in 2006, but these
did not stop the fighting. The dispute with Kabul intensified
because of infiltration from Pakistan's tribal zones and
Baluchistan into Agfhanistan. The US army noted this
deterioration and the advance of the Taliban in southeast
Afghanistan at the expense of Nato forces (1).

On the Pakistan side of the border, the rebelliousness and
radicalisation of the Fata became a major preoccupation.
Caught between US pressure and anti-US public opinion, the
government had to pay for its repressive policies in the
tribal areas. Its largely ineffectual and occasionally
controversial operations included an air raid that killed 80
people in a madrasa in the Bajaur agency on 30 October 2006,
the day that a deal was due. Nine days later a revenge
suicide bombing on a barracks in the Northwest Frontier
Province, outside the Fata, killed 35 recruits.

Negotiations with the tribal chiefs often required the
mediation of the Islamist parties, and especially
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e Islam (JUI, Assembly of Islamic Clergy), led
by Fazlur Rehman, the opposition leader in parliament and an
open supporter of the Taliban. The use of force against
Pakistan's citizens has tarnished the government's image,
without successfully ending the ongoing Talibanisation of the
Fata. There are fears that this process could extend to the
Northwest Frontier Province, which is at present governed by
the Islamists of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA, United
Action Forum).

Another tribal problem

Despite differences, the problem here is also essentially
tribal. Baluchistan provides a large proportion of Pakistan's
gas supply and believes that it is being exploited by the
central government and the wealthy province of Punjab.
Baluchistan is the largest and least populated of Pakistan's
provinces, and has gone through a series of crises since
independence, including the suppression of several
insurgencies (1958-60, 1973-77) (2).

The first phase of the construction of the deep-sea port at
Gwadar and the stationing of more numbers of troops in the
province have worsened the frustration of the Baluch
autonomist movements, which now enjoy the support of
important tribal leaders who previously upheld the political
status quo.

In August 2006 government forces killed Akbar Khan Bugti, a
rebellious former governor of Baluchistan. This pyrrhic
victory radicalised both insurgents (including the Baluch
Liberation Army) and local political parties that support
greater autonomy. The Baluch problem is undermining major
projects -- the port at Gwadar (where Chinese engineers have
been kidnapped) and the gas pipeline linking Iran to India
via Pakistan -- that could boost Pakistan's economy.

`Proxy war' in Kashmir

At first Musharraf mishandled relations with India. By
precipitating the Kargil conflict in 1999, on the line of
control that separates Indian-and Pakistani-controlled
Kashmir, he ended talks between the two governments. Although
limited, this was the first war between two states that had
recently acquired nuclear weapons. Later, for 10 long months
following the failure of the Agra summit in July 2001 and the
terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi in
December 2002, the threat of war loomed again.

In a historic speech in January 2002, Musharraf condemned
jihad. But he had no intention of undoing the painstaking
preparations made by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI) to intervene in Indian Kashmir. These involved
Lashkar-e-Taiba, the armed wing of the powerful
Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (renamed Jamaat ud Dawa after it
was banned) and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Although Indian forces were
mobilised in response, the threat of nuclear confrontation
deterred them from open conflict.

Pakistan was running out of room to manoeuvre. The 9/11
attacks gave the Indian government an excuse to denounce the
proxy war waged by Pakistan in Kashmir using cross-border
terrorism. It was clear that India could find no military
solution after almost 15 years of insurrection in Kashmir.
Musharraf began making concessions in 2003, by announcing
that Pakistan had left aside United Nations resolutions
calling for the Kashmir issue to be settled by referendum,
and by agreeing to composite talks that would put all issues
dividing India and Pakistan on the table beside the central
issue of Kashmir.

This, on top of the government's enlistment on the side of
the US, was the final straw for some jihadists linked to
al-Qaida and supported by some junior officers. In December
2003 Musharraf barely escaped two assassination attempts.
Rigidly structured talks began with India in February 2004
and were declared irreversible in 2005.

But no quick legally agreed solution can be expected on the
Kashmir issue. India might agree to ratify the status quo by
allowing Pakistan to hold the areas that it occupies; but it
rejects any settlement that would place all or part of the
Srinagar valley under Pakistan's control or double mandate.
Pakistan has called for flexibility on both sides, but still
refuses to recognise the line of control inherited from the
wars of 1948, 1965 and 1971.

Possible avenues include greater autonomy for Indian Kashmir;
withdrawal of the jihadists, then of troops; opening the line
of control to road traffic; and even joint consultative
bodies. Discreet negotiations have taken place with the
Kashmiri separatists from the Hurriyat (freedom) Conference,
and even with some Kashmiri combatants from Hizbul
Mujaheddin. The bomb attacks on Mumbai trains in which 180
people died in July 2006 showed that although terrorist
pressures can influence the dialogue between India and
Pakistan, they can no longer halt it.

Extremism isn't just for export

While India continues to drag its heels, Musharraf has made a
series of proposals on Kashmir. His enthusiasm is not enough
to dispel persistent suspicions in India, the US and
Afghanistan about the deep-rooted relationship between the
military leadership, the ISI and extremist groups. Musharraf
made his personal convictions clear when he denounced "bigots
and obscurantists" who give Islam and Pakistan a "bad image".
But it is less certain that he has the political will or
capacity to root out extremism.

The desire to preserve some margin for manoeuvre over Kashmir
and Afghanistan may explain why jihadist forces are kept in
check without being eradicated. It may also explain why the
Pakistani government, suspicious of the increasing Indian
presence in Afghanistan, may welcome Taliban pressure.
Extremism is not just for export: radical Islam has long spun
its web at the heart of Pakistan.

Specific manifestations include the extremist Sunni militias'
campaigns against the Shia minority, which has included
attacks on places of worship; effectively autonomous
preaching networks calling for jihad in Kashmir; armed groups
whose leaders used to be able to connect with al-Qaida
through Afghanistan; and, since the U-turn of 2001, domestic
terrorist attacks on targets both foreign (the Karachi attack
on French naval engineers in 2003; the execution of
journalist Daniel Pearl) and military (Musharraf has long
been designated as a target by al-Qaida's number two, Ayman
al-Zawahiri).

The relationship between the army, political Islamists and
extremists is complicated. During the 2002 elections the
government suppressed and divided the parliamentary
opposition parties (Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League and Benazir
Bhutto's Pakistan People's party). But in the process the
government opened the way for the Islamists of the MMA, which
it had favoured but which now sits with the opposition.

A key component of the MMA, Qazi Hussain Ahmed's
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), remains firm on Kashmir; another, the
JUI, although more flexible on this issue, has maintained its
links with the Taliban. The MMA governs the Northwest
Frontier Province and is a member, beside the pro-Musharraf
faction of the Muslim League, of the ruling coalition in
Baluchistan.

The JI and JUI both preach an austere, backward-looking Islam
that rejects any liberalisation of the law. Musharraf has
backed off several times on this issue; finally, in November
2006, he secured the passage of a Women's Protection Bill,
which transfers trials for rape from the jurisdiction of the
Islamic courts, where the offence must be confirmed by four
male witnesses, to regular criminal courts. This half-measure
failed to end the repressive system established by the Hudood
Ordinance (3), introduced by the former military dictator
Zia-ul-Haq in 1979.

`The poor man's Ataturk'

Opinions vary on armed Islamism and the relationship between
the army and the mullahs. Some accuse Musharraf of compromise
and double-dealing: he bans extremist groups then allows them
to re-form; he preaches enlightened moderation but does
nothing to reform the madrasas; and he has reached an
accommodation with the MMA. Others claim that to overestimate
the influence of radical Islam allows the military to present
itself as the only possible defence against extremists in the
continuing war on terror.

Another school of thought argues that extremism will continue
and even increase until the army and its leader, "a master of
half-measures and the poor man's Ataturk" (4), take a firm
stand. Others believe that only Musharraf, with the support
of the military leadership, can extricate Pakistan gradually
from the structural contradictions that have beset it for the
past 25 years.

In July 2006 a group of key figures, including generals from
the army reserve, called upon Musharraf to give up his
uniform if he sought re-election, and to separate military
and civilian power. He is unlikely to take this advice, since
as long as he remains head of the military hierarchy he
controls a pillar of power: the Corps Commanders' Conference.

Musharraf has managed to split the major political forces
that governed Pakistan between 1988 and 1999. He achieved
this by seducing a significant proportion of the Muslim
League; a few Pakistan People's party MPs; and the Muttahida
Quami Movement that represents the Mohajirs (Pakistan
citizens who migrated from India at the time of partition in
1947) and is powerful in the southeastern Sindh province.
This is a coalition of convenience and has not significantly
eroded the parliamentary opposition.

A `charter of democracy'

A pluralist press can make its voice heard. In exile, former
sworn enemies Bhutto and Sharif signed a "charter of
democracy" (5) in May 2006. Even if it defeated Musharraf,
the opposition would still have to come to terms with the
army. There have been repeated rumours and denials that
Musharraf might strike a deal with Bhutto or even Rehman,
dividing Islamist opposition in parliament.

In December Musharraf announced that the presidential race
would be held before legislative elections. This sent a clear
signal that he hopes to be re-elected by the current
parliament and provincial representatives; and that he is
unwilling to place his political future in the hands of new
assemblies. The regime has raised the major questions posed
by the regional situation and by the need for a paradigm
shift, and this has been debated in the press. There is a
danger that during the electoral campaign they will be
overshadowed by a pragmatism that would confirm the army's
powers and privileges.

There is a worsening disparity between an economy that grew
by an annual average of 7% between 2004 and 2006 and an
uncertain political status quo. The population recently
passed 160 million; pressing social issues are being ignored.
As public education collapses, and health and development are
starved of funds, economic growth finances (for the time
being at least) defence expenditure, which has risen to 20%
of the total budget.

Pakistan's military, technocratic and social elite live in a
different world from the ordinary citizen. Social indicators
have risen slowly since 2000 in literacy, education and
vaccination rates. Yet the World Bank, in its 2006 report on
Pakistan, pointed out that in many respects "social
indicators still lag behind countries with comparable per
capita incomes", particularly in rural areas (6).

Even if the opposition did achieve power, it would not
radically change a policy of active liberalisation which,
according to the report, "has failed to achieve social
progress commensurate with its economic growth".
________________________________________________________

* Jean-Luc Racine is director of research at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique and teaches at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; he is co-editor of `Pakistan:Contours of State and Society' (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002) and author of `Cachemire: Au péril de la guerre' (Autrement, Paris, 2002)

(1) See Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Taliban resurgence in
Afghanistan", Le Monde diplomatique, English language
edition, September 2006.

(2) See Selig Harrison, "Pakistan's Baluch insurgency", Le
Monde diplomatique, English language edition, October 2006.

(3) This law established Islamic courts, over and above the
existing legal system and responsible for applying sharia law
for such offences as adultery, the consumption of alcohol and
theft, which are punishable by sanctions such as whipping,
amputation and stoning. Under the ordinance, a woman who is
unable to prove that she was raped can be prosecuted for
adultery.

(4) Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism, ME Sharpe,
Armonk, New York, 2004.

(5) The two parties agreed not to compromise with the
military government and, if returned to power, to annul the
constitutional changes whereby Musharraf increased the powers
of the president. They would also dissolve the National
Security Council, where the military top brass sit alongside
the country's civilian leaders.

(6) World Bank, "Pakistan Country Overview 2006".



Translated by Donald Hounam