A nuclear test and new realities

P.S. Suryanarayana
The Hindu, 11 October

Washington is a wounded global power, whose preoccupations involving some West Asian countries have compelled it to play second fiddle to China as an advocate of non-proliferation in regard to the DPRK.

One year after the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tested a nuclear weapon, China has emerged stronger as a guru of non-proliferation while the United States has begun to lose its way in East Asia.

In a sense, the ripple effects of the DPRK’s nuclear test go beyond the equation between the U.S. and China. Japan has begun to think on its own of strategic affairs without antagonising its ally, the U.S., and there are new signs of greater ra pport between the DPRK and its southern ethnic neighbour, the Republic of Korea (RoK).

These trends fly against the conventional U.S.-centred “wisdom” on matters of peace and stability in East Asia. A relevant question is whether the state players in this region are more creative now in the strategic affairs domain than they were in the early years of the still-undefined post-Cold War period. In a slightly different perspective, the poser relates to the net gains and losses of the DPRK, whose testing of an atomic weapon on October 9, 2006, set off a paradigm shift in the power balances in East Asia.

About a week before the first anniversary of the detonation, China announced, in its capacity as Chair of the Six-Party Talks, that “the DPRK agreed to disable all [its] existing nuclear facilities, subject to [their] abandonment.” The timeline for the “disablement” is the end of this year, and Pyongyang further “agreed to provide,” by the same date, “a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programmes.”

The six parties, engaged in negotiating and ensuring the de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, are: China, the U.S., the DPRK, RoK, Japan, and Russia. Surely, the peninsula is not the only East Asian arena where a potential flare-up is considered possible but the DPRK’s nuclear test had pushed this theatre to the forefront in this regard. Yet the mood right now on the Korean peninsula is upbeat indeed.

Pyongyang’s latest commitments are not dramatically new, except for the firm timelines that it has now openly agreed to. The sequential ideas of “disablement” and “abandonment” or “dismantlement,” and the parallel notion of “declaration,” were on the drawing board even when Pyongyang agreed to shut down its Yongbyon complex. And, prior to China’s latest announcement, Pyongyang did honour its pledge, made a few months ago, to shut down the complex suspected to be the nerve centre of a nuclear weapons programme.

From a long-term perspective, the key issue in this sub-context about the post-test pattern of behaviour by the DPRK is not really its recent track record of agreeing to, and even honouring, some aspects of de-nuclearisation. The relevant questions, simply, centre on Pyongyang’s strategic retreat, or more precisely compulsions, that can be traced to a variety of external pressures to de-nuclearise. For Pyongyang, the post-test choices have emanated from two sources — its own strategic calculations and equally, or even more importantly, the external pressures.

These pressures have come from not only the U.S., a pivotal “force for stability” on the Korean peninsula, but also from neighbouring China, which, as a rising great power, exudes passion for non-proliferation. More importantly, the DPRK’s status as a nuclear-armed state can complicate the security environment for Beijing too, despite its strong ideological links with Pyongyang since the 1950-53 Korean War. Authoritative Chinese sources told this correspondent that the DPRK did not listen to Beijing’s counsel against treading the nuclear arms path. However, China regained the initiative after Pyongyang crossed the nuclear Rubicon; and the result is reflected in Beijing’s latest announcements about the DPRK’s de-nuclearisation pledges.

Among Pyongyang’s other neighbours, RoK cannot easily accept an ethnically-akin country as a nuclear-armed “enemy,” given the current convergence of their interests for a potentially common political future. For Japan, critical indeed are the inter-related issues of the DPRK’s growing missile-delivery capabilities and its continuing hold over a nuclear arsenal, however small it might be. Highly emotive history, involving Japan as a yesteryear imperial power, on the one side, and the two Koreas as also China, on the other, is a political aspect that Tokyo has not yet sorted out.

Complicating these political cross-currents is the way in which the U.S. still straddles East Asia, even while losing its way as the sole superpower in global politics. Today, Washington is a wounded global power, whose preoccupations involving some West Asian countries have compelled it to play second fiddle to China as an advocate of non-proliferation in regard to the DPRK. An alternative view, articulated by experts like Alan D. Romberg immediately after the DPRK’s test, was “it has not had a harmful effect so far on U.S. interests.” But “the situation is not static,” it was emphasised too.

Pyongyang’s world view is dominated by the lingering memories of the stunning manner in which the U.S. flexed its nuclear muscle in East Asia towards the end of Second World War. Unsurprisingly, Pyongyang made the year-old strategic choice of testing a nuclear weapon, in the face of counsel to the contrary from China, which had saved the DPRK from possible annihilation in the Korean War.

Viewed in this perspective, the latest non-proliferation pledges by the DPRK leader, Kim Jong-il, may seem to be nothing short of a strategic retreat by him. A contrary view is that Mr. Kim may have already reached the optimal point in producing nuclear weapons within the scope afforded by the fissionable materials at his command.

Even if this is not true, his current stockpile, whatever its size, will not be affected by his latest pledges towards “disablement and dismantlement” of the DPRK’s existing nuclear facilities. Some diplomatic creativity may also be needed to bring this stockpile issue under the purview of the promised “declaration of all [of the DPRK’s] nuclear programmes.” In any case, the issue cannot be excluded from the “goal” that the six nations have already agreed to. This relates to “the verifiable de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.”

Logical as this is, Mr. Kim insists that the peninsula-wide “de-nuclearisation” should cover “the extended nuclear deterrence” which the U.S. has constantly granted the RoK as an insurance against an attack by the DPRK. If he is able to press this point, as and when the six parties reach the end-game of de-nuclearising the entire peninsula, the issues may become murkier.

Three trends

Three trends become relevant to such an end-game. First, the latest inter-Korean summit between Mr. Kim and RoK President Roh Moo-hyun has brought into sharp focus the question of a peace regime on the peninsula. This signifies an urgency to end the 1950-53 Korean War, which was brought to a conclusion by an armistice accord involving the U.S.-led United Nations, on one side, and the DPRK and China, on the other. In proposing that efforts be made to establish a peace regime, Mr. Kim has linked the de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula to a larger process that might impinge on the U.S.’ plans for its future role in East Asia. A Korean strategic affairs expert, Hwang Won-tak, points out, “it would be inconceivable for the two Koreas to replace the armistice agreement without improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations.”

Another trend to watch is the likely behaviour of the U.S., which will “lead” the expert group being tasked under the six-party process to prepare for the “disablement” of the DPRK’s existing nuclear facilities. The U.S. may capitalise on such access in such a way as to checkmate the DPRK at every future stage. Relevant, though, to this scenario is the accord between Mr. Kim and Mr. Roh on October 4 that the two Koreas will seek reunification at their “own initiative.” Mr. Kim is trying to pluck the RoK off its orbital path around Washington. For a contrasting view, top Western diplomats in Seoul have told this correspondent that the U.S.-RoK alliance was buffeted by Mr. Roh’s initial reservations about it before he changed his mind. So, the alliance may only get reinvigorated after the imminent presidential election, given the current poll trends, it is said. The ground reality, however, is that the RoK’s younger generation is widely opposed to doing the U.S.’ bidding at any cost.

In this complex climate of emotional intelligence about the U.S.’ intentions, Beijing and Tokyo have begun to plan for a possible future without the U.S. as the sole and hegemonic arbiter in East Asia. For China, its independent foreign policy is the mantra in this regard. And, it is learnt on good authority that Tokyo, not Washington, took the initiative for the possible formation of a quadrilateral group of democracies that could consist of the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia. It is a different matter whether the present Japanese Prime Minister will pursue this idea. Does the U.S. still retain its old “lustre” in East Asia?