In craggy country - Americans Have Not Learnt From NWFP’s History

Raghvendra Singh
The Statesman, 8 & 9 October

Television tickers nearer the date of 9/11 indicated Osama bin Laden’s possible change of address, to Chitral, in the Malakand Agency of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. Ironically, Americans have evinced more interest in this province for until 60 years ago, NWFP was an integral part of undivided India and under Congress rule where, after 15 August 1947, the Pakistan government most shamefully dismissed a Congress ministry. NWFP is India’s own backyard. Not many in India understand its strategic importance and continue to be ignorant of its affairs. Is it not incumbent then to stir our casual minds and explore this region? Attempt I will, but as a student of history can only do so with hindsight.

The British came to acquire NWFP when Punjab was annexed to them in 1849. It was part of Punjab then and continued to be so till Curzon, on grounds of administrative expediency, bifurcated the province, separating the NWFP but treating it with circumspection. Serving in NWFP acquired an aura of its own; Sir Olof Caroe, the not so famous former governor of the province coining the word ‘paladins’ for those officers who served these frontiers. Some, like John Nicholson and Herbert Edwards had come to deserve this epithet.

The main tribes

The main tribes of NWFP, mostly Pathans, have their own areas of influence where they dominate for example the Mahsuds and Wazirs in the south; Mohmands, Orakzais, Afridis, Khataks and Shinwaris in the centre and the Yusufzais, Swatis and Chitralis in the north. In some ways the history of NWFP and Afghanistan has been that of a paradox. Though there is no priesthood in Islam, the mullahs there have continued to influence the people. No act of worship and no religious rite can be well performed in the absence of a mullah for a Pathan is a Muslim to the backbone and prides himself on his religious zeal. To him the mullah is an embodiment of what is most rational and sacred. The history of the Pathans is replete with names of famous mullahs acquiring the status of religious leaders such as the Mullah Powindah, the Faqir of Ipi and more recently Mullah Omar.

Theirs is also a simultaneous rise to political influence. Most of the leaders opposed to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were religious figures or had religious sanctions. The situation is no different now. The pervasiveness of Islamic belief and the hatred of non-believers, historically, has made intrusion by outsiders in Pashtun (Pathan) country a dangerous proposition. A British officer serving in the heart of the Pashtun tribal area, Bannu, in the mid-19th century had this to say: “A well-educated man will, in all probability, be religious, but an ignorant one is certain to be superstitious. A more utterly ignorant and superstitious people than the Bannuchis I never saw. The vilest jargon was to them pure Arabic from the blessed Koran, the clumsiest imposture a miracle, and the fattest faqir a saint”.

Most revolts against the British were inspired by these mullahs generating a climate of Islamic revivalism akin to that which pervades NWFP now. ‘There is no God but God, and Mohammed is the prophet of God’. Such is the cry which inspires these people. It is by this cry that the ghazi is stirred to kill. So great has been the power of this call that a borrowed horse from a Pathan chief, at the utterance of this cry alone, can dart off at a gallop, because, as in earlier years, it was accustomed to charge into the enemy’s ranks hearing such a cry.

Is it yet well understood that the mullah is an important enemy? Would it not be prudent to make use of the mullah’s insight into Pushtun belief and organization, the way they use their power and influence to rouse the Pathan tribes against the infidels? The only way to nullify the mullah’s influence is to use Pushtun customs to overcome religious opposition, for example, that of pakhtunwali (code of honour) and melmastia (hospitality). Pathans do not believe in melmastia merely as a form of politeness. It dictates a whole code of behaviour. A host once having given hospitality becomes responsible for the safety and comfort of his guest. To harm, insult or inconvenience his guest becomes a matter of shame and would do irreparable harm to the host’s reputation. All this is part of Pathan ethos ignored often by people interfering in the internal politics of Afghanistan and NWFP. How is then one to work around these age-old traditions? To negate mullah influence and the Pathan code of honour can only confound matters.

Applying tactics of punishment and raid in tribal areas would simply not work. An earlier case in point is that of Mullah Powindah demanding the release of some Mahsuds imprisoned on charges of killing a British civil servant. On the British refusal the Mashuds revolted under Powindah’s leadership to be only brought under control after great loss to life.

Another example is that of the Faqir of lpi who sought refuge in the caves near Wana in South Waziristan. His mystical reputation was enhanced by the failure of all attempts by strong Gurkha contingents to capture him. But one as respected as the Faqir of lpi could only sustain his charisma till both honour and economic expediency were being well served.

With the British departing in 1947, and the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan, the religious base of his struggle got substantially weakened. Any lesson for the Americans to be drawn from this case? Unlike the Americans, the British involvement in NWFP was much more over time and space. They had directly administered these areas and had gradually evolved a professional administrative cadre solely dedicated to NWFP, men of great experience. In comparison, the Americans can at best hope to exert an indirect influence through the ruling elite of Pakistan and Afghanistan. If history is anything to go by, the experience of Russian occupation of Afghanistan and the help meted out to the resistance from NWFP should certainly make the Americans apprehensive. After all, it was the Americans who were involved in providing assistance against the Soviet occupation.

Religious fervour

The efficacy of Pakistan to persecute terrorists on its own terra firma, in NWFP, on behalf of NATO, is questionable. Events in NWFP amply bear this out. How does one then overcome the religious fervour of a Pathan? More importantly, how to nurture feelings of respect and admiration sufficient for the Pathan to abandon his deeply held feeling of antipathy towards the outside forces of NATO? Unfortunately, that is an oxymoron, for if there were lessons to be taken from NWFP’s history, Americans have certainly not done so.

Is there a silver lining for the Americans? Maybe, for the tribes find it immensely difficult to coalesce. It is seldom that they have come together, exception being the times when they rose in popular revolt. This of course cuts both ways. The mutual dislike for Americans gives them reason to unite.

But if the Americans succeed in playing the tribes, one against the other, through financial and such other incentives amounting to direct bribes, they may still attain partial success. The problem has also been that of the tactics of war; it has changed little over the past decades, the only major introduction being aerial bombing. The Pathans, though short on weaponry excel themselves in the warfare native to their country. Invariably, attempts at capture prove abortive. Even with depleting support there are always others ready to follow the militants. Osama bin Laden could not have chosen a better place for himself, if at all he has. It is he in fact, who seems to have heeded well the lessons of local history.

Up north to Chitral now, which many fear is the new base of the Al Qaida chief. Even Pakistanis admit of Chitral as a remote country. Kohistanis inhabit the area along the Malakand Pass. They are a wild race with strains of Pathan, Mongol and Chinese in their blood, their region well known for harbouring fugitives and therefore best left alone.

Traversing these roads of Malakand Agency en route to Chitral, one comes across the ‘Churchill Picquet’, a place where young Winston made his mark serving the Queen’s own Hussars in 1897.

Chitral, which sounds more like a shot from a rifle echoing down the slopes of a frontier gorge, is on the main and shortest line of communication between the Punjab, Afghanistan and the Central Asian region of Oxus. It lies close to the passes over the Hindu Kush, a circumstance which gives it outstanding strategic importance.

Size & desolation

The dominant note of Chitral is its size and desolation. This is how Sir George Scott Robertson, the British political agent described the area in 1895: “It takes time for the mind to recover from the depression which the stillness and melancholy of the landscape at first compels. The startling sensation of the immensity, in comparison to man’s minutesness, strikes home with almost stunning effect….. while cruelty, the predominant emotion in Chitral gets symbolized in those circling eagles and the straight purposeful flight of the hawks.”

It is said of Chitral that once food was so scarce there that ‘a fat man had never been seen and even the upper classes looked underfed, and the most effective of bribes was a good meal’.

The Chitralis are a non-Pathan people of mixed race and unknown origin. They may have come from Wakhan and the Pamirs, and may have borne the blood of Mongolian invaders. There is also an Indo-Afghan strain in them, and like the Pathans, they are Muslims. As for them, it is said that few are more treacherous. Sir Olof Caroe, who spent half his lifetime on the frontier, talking of the old enemies of the British, the Pathans, admired their courage, gallant bearing, and courtesy, and their preference for fighting honourably to the bitter end. Caroe said that the Chitralis, who were not Pathans, had inherited all the inherent cruelty of their neighbours without their honesty, and the early history of their country was ‘a monstrous tale of murder and perfidy’. Sir Francis Edward Younghusband, once the political agent at Chitral, said the Chitralis ‘were like children ~ impulsive, gay, careless, easily roused and easily soothed … their bad points were the same as children’s always wanting presents and the more they were given the more they wanted’.

Within easy reach of Chitral lies Badakhshan, the northern-most province of Afghanistan, where Marco Polo in the thirteenth century found rubies and lapis lazuli being mined in plenty, and its local horsemanship, which quite impressed him.

Also in near proximity lies Nooristan/Kafiristan, whose people had remained infidels in the eyes of Islam, practising a religion which idolized horses and other figures carved from wood, an area so remote and subject to such wild Victorian speculations that Kipling, who never ever went there, chose it as the setting for his story of The Man who would be King.

Chitral is one part of the world where polo comes second only to religion as a popular obsession. The hard climate may have just had something to do with the failure to breed and therefore traditionally, the horses have come from Badakhshan except during the period of Russian occupation when Chitral and other places in the north had to make do with what Punjab had to offer.

Through the Durah Pass, trains of ponies would make the journey to Chitral. But before they were sold to the Chitralis, a valuable cargo would be unloaded, opium. The opium would then make its journey down to Nowshera, on way to the ports of Pakistan. It was a trade that seemed harmless to the Chitralis whose need for ponies for polo far outweighed all other considerations. Wonder if this trade still continues. In all likelihood it does.

How inaccessible India is to Chitral can be gauged by retracing the footsteps of Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief of India in 1903. With the Line of Control intervening now, and no road connectivity to boot, things may not have changed much. From Srinagar to the Yasin Valley adjoining Chitral, is a journey through inhospitable passes and glaciers.

Beginning with Woolar Lake, then to Bandipur through Kamri and Traghal Passes each (12,000 ft. high) in to the Pamirs (Kilik Pass) via Batur glacier to Gilgit, from where Chitral is about 220 miles.

Field Marshal Lord Birdwood had accompanied Lord Kitchener on this journey in August 1903. He recounts it thus: ‘The Rajah of Poonch had lent us some excellent riding mules, as indeed some small hill ponies of that country which are said to go wherever a dog can. The mules have an uncomfortable habit of clinging to the extreme outside edge of a narrow and precipitous mountain path, an idea based (like many of this animal’s idiosyncracies) on sound common sense since it prevents the load from knocking against the rockface on the inner side. But when a mule starts waving its outer legs well over a precipice, the only thing to do is to trust its judgement and hope for the best, for one’s confidence is always justified. When the tracks got difficult, even mules had to be discarded in favour of yaks, a painfully slow but extremely safe means of transport. The best way to tackle a steep climb is to hang on to a mule or yak’s tail, and let him pull you up, which they do so readily provided they have no weight on their back.’’

More than a hundred years ago, in 1903 to be precise, the British raised an outfit, specifically meant for this region ~ the Chitral Scouts, with twelve hundred men under British officers. The object was the creation of a body of trained marksmen to defend the passes into Chitral. Each one of the 1,200 was a born cragsman, and none ever saw service outside Chitral in normal circumstances. Therefore their knowledge of the local mountains was unique.

Mountain warfare

The Scouts only speak ‘Khowar’, a language no one else can understand. They have rarely left their mountains and valleys, a tradition maintained even after the British left. Otherwise, as always, they have watched their mountain passes, practised their musketry, and exercised upon the familiar crags with preposterous ease. As for their mountain warfare tactics, in which they rate amongst the best, it is quite simple ~ gain mountain height, that way one can have the enemy the way one wants him, impotent.

Drosh, a town near Chitral has been their headquarters. From the terrace of this headquarters can be seen that famous ridge, the Durand Line with Afghanistan on the other side. The Scouts regularly exercise on this ridge. There are 42 passes between Chitral and Afghanistan and it is their job to keep an eye on each one of them. Chitral’s suitability as a good hideaway, a safe haven for terrorists cannot be doubted.

Chitral is remote, possessed of a difficult terrain and so located that keeping vigil on its numerous entry and exit points is an unworkable task. If the Pakistan government so wanted to check infiltration it would find Chitral Scouts uniquely placed to deal with it. And as for us, getting to know more about the Chitral Scouts should therefore become even more tempting now.

An IAS officer, the author is a Joint Secretary to the Government of India, currently posted as secretary to the Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha