Continuing myopia in West Asia

Hamid Ansari
The Hindu, 12 March

The Palestinian quest for nationhood, the Iraqi endeavour to retrieve it, the Iranian determination to assert it. The impulses, in each case, contradict the imperatives of hegemonic regional or external power.

IN 1972 Henry Kissinger spelt out his approach to the Middle East question: "a prolonged stalemate that would move the Arabs towards moderation and the Soviets to the fringes of Middle East diplomacy." The second part of the recipe was successful over time; the first, however, produced the opposite of what was intended. It was only radical thought and action that moved America, then and later. The resulting dilemma has been disconcerting to the policy makers and damaging to their credibility. The Road Map of 2003, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, was one instance of it; the recent initiative by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in the face of looming disaster in Iraq, is another.
External power, neo-patriarchy, and suppressed aspirations are common ingredients in a complex and diverse picture. One result of it is the absence of tranquillity; another is the endless quest for new equations.

Governments tend to simplify matters by positing them in dichotomies that remain inadequate and inevitably overlap: conservative and progressive, tradition and modernity, moderate and radical. Forgotten in the process are notions of wisdom and justice.

Wisdom, wrote Abba Eban, is born only when illusions die. In the West Asian context, these illusions pertain principally to the denial of nationhood in three situations: the Palestinian quest for it, the Iraqi endeavour to retrieve it, the Iranian determination to assert it. The impulses, in each case, contradict the imperatives of hegemonic regional or external power.

In the case of Palestine, four decades of occupation have neither bestowed legitimacy on the occupying power nor has it crushed the Palestinian will to resist it. The electoral victory of Hamas and the Israeli bombing and blockade eventually resulted in a stalemate; the Palestinian empowerment was drained away in the internecine Fatah-Hamas conflict; the war with Hezbollah shattered the myth of military invincibility and damaged Israel psychologically and politically. Motives, altruistic and others, propelled the Saudi initiative and the resultant Makkah Agreement. Its brevity is indicative of the tension underlying it.

The inclusion, and exclusion, of specific issues mentioned in the last paragraph is reflective of the distance travelled by Hamas.

Nevertheless, the reluctance of Israel, the United States, and the European Union to accept it does not bode well for the revival of the peace process and may come to be viewed as another instance of an initiative emanating from a `moderate' Arab state being disowned. The International Crisis Group is right in asserting that the international community, and the Quartet, should see the Makkah Agreement "as an opportunity to revive the peace process, rather than as yet another excuse to bury it." Hopefully, there would be an evolution of perceptions by the time the Arab summit convenes in Riyadh later this month.

In Iraq, the deliberate destruction of the state structure impacted adversely on social cohesion. The process commenced in 1991 with the regime of sanctions and was analysed in depth among others by Sarah Graham-Brown. The social policies of Saddam Hussein, in the last decade of his rule, aggravated them. The temptation of pursuing a policy of divide and rule, however, was irresistible for the occupying power. Its consequences were not anticipated. The situation now has run out of control. The decision in the Saudi-Iranian summit on March 4 to discourage sectarian divide is a case of too little, too late since neither is in a position to control the cycle of frenzy, revenge, and anarchy that has been unleashed.

The decision of the U.S., after a delay of 12 precious months, to take part in talks involving all of Iraq's neighbours, is an admission of the viability of the only remaining course of action that might help salvage Iraq. The preparatory meeting, at the level of ambassadors, must lead to a higher level conclave where hard decisions could be taken. These decisions, inevitably, necessitate a revamping of the arrangements for the governance of Iraq that were so hastily incorporated in the new constitution.

Iran remains forbidding to the prudent and tantalising to the adventurous. Its domestic impulses, complex and in constant flux, hamper definitive judgments. Four distinguishing traits stand out: pride, nationalism, insecurity, and pragmatism. Each of these has come to the fore in the debate about the nuclear programme. The recent announcement about a new high denomination currency note, with a picture of the nuclear insignia of electrons in orbit around an atom and bearing a saying of the Prophet of Islam highly complimentary to the Persian genius, is indicative of the national pride involved in the enrichment argument. An attempt to crush it, even if moderately successful, would be counter productive.

An opportunity for diplomacy lies in the other two characteristics of the Iranian scene: insecurity and pragmatism. Despite protestations, isolation would be unpalatable and there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an alternate approach would make headway, albeit not without much haggling. A starting point for it could be International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei's assertion: "We at the IAEA lack conclusive evidence. We have yet to see a smoking gun that would convict Tehran. I can make assumptions about intentions, but I cannot verify intentions, only facts." If so, the case against Iran is yet to be proved, except in the court of prejudice.

It is now evident that the West Asian crises are interlinked and interdependent. Attempts at isolation and prioritisation have met with failure. Does not the gravity of the situation propel us towards an approach that is procedurally and qualitatively different?

A digression into the political philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau may help resolve the impasse. He commenced his enquiry into the Principles of Political Right with a teasing question: "whether, taking men as they are and laws as they can be made, it is possible to establish some just and certain rule of administration in civil affairs... To reconcile what right permits with what interest prescribes, so that justice and utility may not be severed." The prescription would hold good for contemporary West Asia if the words `civil affairs' are substituted by `international affairs' and the national interests of individual players balanced by considerations of justice.

Given the realities of power, this endeavour has to commence with the U.S. whose attempt at establishing primacy of unchallenged power has not only failed but has also resulted, as Anatol Lieven put it, "in a horrible moral and political mess." The effort now is to develop a revitalised alliance of regional surrogates. The latter, and many others, seek to have the more glaring causes of failure addressed, not piecemeal but altogether. They realise that moderation is often a function of satisfaction.

In practical terms, this would amount to forsaking the unilateral approach advocated by Kissinger in favour of a comprehensive initiative to seek viable solutions to the three nationhood impulses and would involve (a) a time-bound initiative by the Quartet and the EU to go beyond the termite-ridden Road Map of 2003 and ensure Final Status negotiations on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 and the Saudi-Arab League Plan of 2002; (b) an international conference on Iraq with the participation of all its neighbours; (c) commencement of nuclear negotiations with Iran, without the precondition of suspension of enrichment but with credible guarantees that such enrichment would not exceed the present levels; and (d) inclusion of Iran in a broader regional security dialogue on the Persian Gulf.

The present level of turbulence in West Asia is a matter of serious concern to the world beyond the region. India is close enough to be affected. An aggravation would impinge on essential national interests.

Would Indian diplomacy initiate, even at the risk of adjusting positions hitherto taken, a move for simultaneous and parallel movement on each of these questions?

The writer is a former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations.